ABOUT THE AUTHOR
CLEMENT ANSELM EVANS, (Feb. 25, 1833—July 2, 1911), was born in Stewart
County, Georgia. He came from a martial family, with ancestors who fought in
the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Creek Indian War in Georgia.
He studied law at William Evans Tracy Gould's law school in Augusta, and earned his license to practice before He
became a judge of the inferior court of Stewart County in 1855, and a member of
the Georgia State Senate in 1859. He received his military education in various
volunteer militia companies to which he belonged as a youth. As a presidential
elector in 1860, he voted for John C. Breckinridge, and immediately after the
election, in the expectation of war, helped to organize a local military
company. He did not serve in it, however, but enlisted the next spring in the
31st Georgia Infantry, of which he was appointed major, being commissioned Nov.
19, 1861. With the exception of a few months on the defensive lines below
Savannah, he served the entire war with the Army of Northern Virginia. His
regiment, of which he became colonel in April 1862, was at first in Stonewall
Jackson's division and then successively under Jubal Early and James B. Gordon.
Evans led his regiment in the Peninsula Campaign, acted as brigade commander at
times in 1862, including the latter part of the Battle of Fredericksburg, and
commanded his regiment at Gettysburg. Evans was appointed brigadier-general in
May 1864, assumed command of Gordon's
brigade and led it in Early's raid against Washington. Upon Gordon’s assignment
to command of the Second Army Corps as acting lieutenant-general in November
1864, Evans succeeded Gordon in the command of the division. In this position
he served at first on the right of Lee's army at Hatcher's Run, and
subsequently in the trenches immediately opposite Petersburg. In the retreat of
Lee, his division was in some kind of fighting almost daily, and in the final
attack at Appomattox he led it into action, being engaged at the moment of the
actual surrender. Notice that negotiations for surrender were in progress had
reached neither Evans nor the Union troops opposing him, and Evans had just
secured a local success, taking several guns and seventy-eight prisoners, when
he received news that the surrender had taken place. General Evans was in
nearly all the battles in Virginia, and was five times wounded, twice severely.
At Fredericksburg, in December
1862, he had been very much impressed and depressed by the carnage and
suffering which he saw, and he later said that he made up his mind then that if
he were allowed to survive the war he would spend the rest of his life trying
to teach men how to live together instead of murdering each other. On his
thirtieth birthday, Feb. 25, 1863, he resolved to enter the ministry, and after
the war, in December 1865, he applied for admission to the North Georgia
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and thus began a ministry
of more than twenty-five years. While a resident of Augusta, Ga., he ventured
into business, organizing the Augusta Real Estate & Improvement Company and
the Augusta & Summerville Land Company, and was a director of the Augusta
Exposition Company. In 1892 he retired from the ministry, feeling himself unfit
for parochial duties because of disability resulting from the five wounds he
had received in the war.
All the latter part of his life was
spent in Atlanta. Upon the organization of the United Confederate Veterans in
1889, he had been chosen as its "Adjutant General and Chief of
Staff," and he continued active in the work of the organization for the
rest of his life. For twelve years he was commander of its Georgia division,
for three years commander of a department (of seven states), and in 1908 was
elected commander-in-chief. He published a Military History of Georgia in 1895,
and then undertook the editorship of the Confederate Military History, a work
in twelve volumes which appeared in 1899. In addition to editing the series, he
contributed two articles, “A Civil History of the Confederacy,” and this
monograph, “An Outline of Confederate Military History.” After the completion
of this historical work, he interested himself in the movement for the
establishment at Richmond of the Confederate Memorial Institute, the museum of
history and art popularly known as the "Confederate Battle Abbey." He
served as president of the organization until his death. The building was
completed and opened some years later. He was co-editor with Allen D. Candler
of Georgia, a three-volume work in cyclopedic form, published in 1906. Educational
matters always interested him. He was trustee of three colleges, and helped in
the establishment of a loan fund association which has assisted many young men
in securing an education. He was also in charge of the finances of the
Preachers Aid Association and held public office once more, as a member of the
State Prison Commission.
THE OUTLINE OF MILITARY HISTORY
[197] ONLY a broad general view of
military operations during the war between the Confederate States of America
and the United States of America may be expected in this sketch. The object of
the brief story of the great struggle herein told is to simply show the
progress of the leading military events which at length determined the fate of
the Southern Confederacy. The political aspects of the contention between the
great belligerents will receive little notice, it being sufficient to observe
that the Confederate States claimed the right to be one of the nations of the
earth, and this claim was denied by the United States. Upon this issue war was
joined between the two powers, and thereupon foreign nations accorded
belligerent rights to both. The details of the struggle have been given by able
writers in the various volumes of this general work [The twelve volume Confederate Military History: A Library of
Confederate States History, published in 1899 by the Confederate Publishing
Company and edited by Evans].
INITIAL EVENTS
The Confederate government was
formed by seven organized States, which, having seceded from the United States
by separate action, and thus become each an independent State, proceeded
formally, in a congress of delegates, to adopt a constitution for their
confederation, under which they proposed to govern themselves. But, previous to
this action, each State assumed for itself the sovereign rights and obligations
of independent government. All land within any State’s boundaries became its
own eminent domain; all the population became subject to its jurisdiction; its
laws were supreme and its flag was the symbol of sovereignty. Each State thus
became a government which must organize its armies and navies [198] for the
defense of its people, as well as enact laws to meet their civic needs.
In compliance with this right and
duty South Carolina, the first to secede, began to organize its small army and
to seek by treaty the peaceable acquisition of certain forts and arsenals held
by the military force of the United States. The other States, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas, pursued a similar course, or,
despairing of obtaining the consent of the United States, entered into the
possession of the forts, arsenals and other government property within their
boundaries, with a show of force sometimes, but happily at first without
conflict of arms or shedding of blood.
South Carolina declared its
independence on the 20th of December, 1860, by a convention of its people,
which at the same time authorized the enforcement of its laws by civil process
and the organization of a military force for protection against foreign
invasion. No military movement, however, occurred in the beginning of this new
political order, that indicated hostility to any State or country. But, six
days after South Carolina seceded, one unfortunate act of a United States
officer inaugurated “the state of war.” Major Robert Anderson, of the United States Army,
commanding in the harbor of Charleston and occupying Fort Moultrie, spiked the
guns of that fort, destroyed the carriages of the 32-pounders, removed or
destroyed the ammunition, and moved his supplies and his garrison abruptly and
secretly to join the garrison of Fort
Sumter. This very
decided hostile movement, by which the commanding officer concentrated his
forces at the stronger fort, was unquestionably, in technical definition at
least, an act of war, Major Anderson meant it to be so, since he stated as his
reason for thus acting that he feared attack, and “if attacked the garrison
would never have surrendered without a fight.” The object of the movement was
to strengthen his position and prepare to meet his enemy at better advantage. [199]
The abandoned fort was therefore promptly occupied by South Carolina troops,
and the State also seized such other property as could be taken without
bloodshed.
Nearly coincident with this
movement of Major Anderson occurred the purchase and equipping of vessels in
the New York harbor to carry reinforcements of supplies and troops to Fort
Sumter. General Winfield Scott, the commander-in-chief of the
United States army, who had constantly insisted on coercive military measures,
again urged President [James] Buchanan, on the 30th of December, to send 250 recruits from
New York harbor, with extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsistence
stores to reinforce the fort which Major Anderson now held. The President
promptly ordered the reinforcements. The secretaries of war and the navy were
immediately instructed, the appropriate orders to Army and Navy officers were
issued, and on the 31st day of December, 1860, the measures for an armed
reinforcement of Fort Sumter were fully adopted and carried into immediate
operation. A few days’ delay unexpectedly ensued, but as quickly as possible,
January 5, 1861, the steamer Star of the West left New York for Charleston on a
warlike mission with 250 troops and six months’ provisions, and was followed
two days later by the warship Brooklyn,
Captain [David] Farragut commanding.
The expedition of the Star of the West failed, notwithstanding
its well-devised plans, nearly as the circumstances of the failure are related
by Lieutenant [Charles R.] Woods, Ninth United States Infantry, commanding the recruits on board.
His report shows that on arrival near his destination he steamed up the main
channel in Charleston Harbor, and was within 134 miles of Fort
Sumter, with his
troops hidden from view, when his vessel was fired upon from Morris Island. The
Star of the West kept on under the
fire of the South Carolina battery, but finding it impossible to take the
supplies and his command of infantry into Fort Sumter, Lieutenant [200] Woods
reluctantly ordered the ship about, and made his way out of the harbor. Captain
[John] McGowan, who commanded the Star of
the West, was specially mentioned by Lieutenant Woods for his efforts “to
put the troops in Fort Sumter.” This attempt at armed reinforcement occurred on
the 9th of January, and is mentioned in connection with the strategy of Major
Anderson as another event occurring thus early in the “inauguration of war.”
Its special significance appears in the light of the principle already agreed
on between the State of South Carolina and Buchanan’s administration, that
reinforcement of Fort Sumter in this manner had at least a hostile bearing,
equivalent, as South Carolina understood it, to an act of war.
The United States government at
this date actively reinforced Forts Pickens, Taylor, Key West and Jefferson,
and ordered the withdrawal of several war vessels from foreign stations for the
purpose of increasing the home squadron, to be distributed along the Southern
coasts. The United States naval force available for aggression was inefficient,
but such as could be employed were actively threatening the Southern ports. The
activity of the Buchanan administration, notwithstanding the vacillation of the
President, was sufficient to withhold from the Southern seceded States many
valuable positions, among which may be named the forts on the coasts of
Florida, as well as Fort Pickens and Fort Sumter. The Confederate government
when formed in February, at Montgomery, found its territory occupied with
hostile forces at important points on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and the
future action of the States on its northern and western borders still a painful
uncertainty. The conditions at that time were already warlike.
COMPARISON BETWEEN
THE TWO GOVERNMENTS
Before further relating the
military events of the Confederate war, a view should be taken of the relative
situations [201] of the two great contestants. The expectation of the
Confederates was to extend their government over nearly or quite all of the
area commonly called the South. The north boundary line of the magnificent
country which they designed to cover with the Confederate constitutional
government ran westward north of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri and the
Indian Territory. South of that long line spread many large States and
territories, reaching from the Ohio River to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean
and Gulf of Mexico. Fourteen great States and two or three territories lay
within these boundaries, occupying a region of great fertility and beauty, with
all accessories of climate and water, and all natural facilities for commerce,
manufacturing, mining and agriculture. The total area was more than a million
square miles; the population intelligent, brave, thrifty and increasing in
wealth. Of this population, between five and a half and six millions were of
the white race, almost wholly natives; the remainder, four and a half to five
millions, were negroes, nearly all slaves.
The people of this fine region were
not prepared for war and certainly did not desire it. When the seven States
instituted the Confederacy there was no army or navy, except such as each seceded
State had hastily gathered. They did not have enough guns and ammunition to
fight one battle of respectable proportions, and until other States joined them
they had no foundries, no powder mills, nor other manufactories of the
munitions of war. They were a peaceable, agricultural and commercial people,
who were ready enough to fight on provocation or for their convictions, but
they had not expected a war with the Northern States and had made no
preparation for that calamity. Under an act of the United States Congress there
had been sent to the arsenals of the South in May, 1860, a large number of
muskets and rifles, which it has been said armed the Confederacy; but on
investigation these were found to be of such little service [202] that the
Southern armies were glad to throw them down at Bull Run and elsewhere in order to pick up
the better guns which their enemies left on the battlefields. The arms referred
to were old percussion muskets, percussion rifles and altered muskets—all old
patterns—which Congress gave willingly to any State that would take them. They
had been deposited in the Charleston, North Carolina, Augusta, Mount Vernon and
Baton Rouge arsenals, and after secession went into possession of the various
States. Such of them as could be used were placed temporarily in the hands of
troops.
As rapidly as possible the
Confederate government made military preparations to meet the invasion of its
territory that would probably take place. The seceded States turned over the
forts and arsenals within their boundaries to the Confederate government, and
each State began with considerable vigor to organize and equip a military
force. The Confederate government attempted in the beginning to organize a
small army of about 11,000 regulars, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and an
engineer corps. Congress authorized [President Jefferson Davis] to call for a volunteer force of 100,000 men, and
appropriated the money for its support. But the insignificant numbers put into
the field before the first of May showed not only the difficulty of rapidly
organizing and equipping a great military force, but also the effect of the
uncertainty prevailing at the South as to the purpose of the Federal
government. In illustration of the character of the military preparations of
these first days of the Confederacy, it may be noted that General [Braxton] Bragg reported his force at Pensacola in March at 1,116,
and accompanied his report with an appeal which elicited a promise of 5,000
more. [P.G.T.] Beauregard was then in command of 2,000 at
Charleston, and other important stations were manned in the same proportion.
These, however, do not comprise the entire military organized in the South, for
each State had already called and accepted many companies which [203] were held
in readiness to be equipped for the field of battle.
The lack of a navy was not only
very apparent, but the difficulty of creating this important means of defense
was nearly appalling. Many of the best officers of the United States Navy had
resigned and reported at Richmond for active service in the Confederacy. [Josiah] Tattnall, [Franklin] Buchanan, [Paul Jones] Semmes, [H.J.] Hartstene, [George N.] Hollins, [Lawrence] Rousseau, [Duncan N.] Ingraham, [George W.] Randolph and others, who did great service and acquired great
fame, were among the accomplished naval officers first assigned to duty by the
Navy Department at Montgomery. About 200 officers of the United States Navy, of
all grades, resigned their commissions early in 1861, and with a nice sense of
honor, not one of them who had charge of a ship brought it into the possession
of the Confederacy. What is called the nucleus of the Confederate navy
consisted of the few vessels which were seized by the seven States soon after
each had seceded, in the aggregate about ten, the most powerful carrying only
ten guns. Congress authorized the increase of this little navy by the purchase
of ten gunboats, and distributed the gallant officers who had offered their
services among various naval posts. Yet, notwithstanding the lack of essentials
for creating a navy, the skillful officers above named, with those of like
character who subsequently joined them, gave a wonderful fame to this arm of
Confederate defense.
The Southern movement was also
sustained at its outset by military leaders recognized as the choice spirits of
the United States army, who gave up their commissions in obedience to the
action of their States. Among them were Albert Sidney Johnston, Braxton Bragg,
P.[G.]T. Beauregard and the venerable David E. Twiggs, who were soon joined by Joseph E. Johnston, Robert E. Lee,
and others whose names will appear hereafter. Military leaders such as these
were placed from year to year in command of “the incomparable Southern armies,”
winning from Mr. Horace Greeley the tribute: “The rebels [204]
were seldom beaten through pusillanimity, never through the treachery of their
leaders.”
Such was the general situation of
the Southern Confederacy preceding the forcible attempt to reinforce Fort
Sumter. The government was fully organized, the disposition was peaceful, the
military and naval forces inadequate, the leadership superb, and the people
ardently devoted to the cause of separate independence; but the new government
was to be forced to stand by its ability to maintain itself against military
power, or fall by the insufficiency of its own military support.
The preparedness of the United
States for the war which they were about to make was materially greater than
that of the Confederacy. The population of the United States in 1861, exclusive
of the seceded States, was over twenty millions, nearly all white, almost four
times the white population of the South. The States comprising the Union at
that time were situated north of the Ohio and extended from the Atlantic to the
Pacific Ocean. The Southern line of this vast territory lay along the northern
and western borders of the Confederacy, giving advantages for invasion at many
points. The States east of the Mississippi River were populous, thrifty and
aggressive. In general resources for making successful war, the States of the
northern section of the Union exceeded the South in a proportion much greater
than their fourfold excess of population.
The general trade, domestic and
foreign, of the entire United States, including the South, had steadily
increased during the preceding decade, until twenty-five foreign countries were
seeking business here with over 11,000 vessels, while the Southern trade alone
amounted to an estimated sum of $400,000,000 annually in product of the soil
exchanged for Northern manufactured goods. The imports of 1860-61 were
$335,000,000 and the exports, $248,000,000. The total debt of the government
was but $69,000,000.
[205] For war purposes the regular
army contained 16,000 men, chiefly stationed on the western frontiers, while
the volunteer militia system of the States permitted of a rapid increase of
this force through requisitions upon the governors. The whole naval force in
commission, as reported by a congressional committee in January, 1861,
consisted of five squadrons of twenty-five ships in various foreign waters, the
home squadron of eleven ships stationed in the Gulf of Mexico and along the
Atlantic Coast, and twenty-eight other ships in various United States ports to
be refitted for service, making a total of sixty-four vessels belonging to the
Navy. To these should be added six store-ships and seven receiving ships, also
serving in the Navy. The report of the Secretary of the Navy shows that in
March, 1861, the total number of vessels belonging to the Navy was ninety,
carrying 2,415 guns and a complement of 7,600 men, of which sixty-nine ships
were available, and this valuable navy was rapidly increased by construction
and purchase. The whole of it remained in the possession of the United States.
For construction and preservation of all ordnance there were at least four
large foundries, fifteen armories and arsenals, besides a large number of
gunpowder mills and manufactories of general army equipment located in the
Northern section. Notwithstanding the secession of seven large States, the
government still held Fortress Monroe, Harper’s Ferry, Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk, Forts Sumter, Pickens
and many minor strongholds on the Southern coast during the first months of
1861. The oceans were open to its commerce as well as to its war fleets; its
resources were magnificent as well as rapidly available, and nothing seemed to
obstruct the quick subjugation of the Southern States except the obligations of
a sacred instrument—the Constitution of the United States.
[206] ACTUAL
HOSTILITIES BEGIN
Abraham Lincoln, inaugurated President of the United States on March
4th, soon adopted the war policy which had been initiated by the concentration
of troops by Major [Robert] Anderson at Fort Sumter in December, 1860,
the ordering of the Star of the West
to Charleston Harbor in January, 1861, with troops, arms and supplies, and the
summons of several ships of the distant squadrons to steam homeward. The policy
most practicable for immediate hostilities as became apparent to President
Lincoln’s advisers, was an invasion of the Confederacy by way of the ocean and
the gulf. The first objective point, Charleston; the first State to be
overthrown and brought to terms, South Carolina; the first movement,
reinforcement of Fort Sumter, peaceably if permitted, otherwise by force. This
plan was maturely considered during March, while the Confederate leaders were
held in suspense with the hope of peace. which caused them to wait for the
action of the Federal administration. At length, on the 8th of April, South
Carolina was officially informed that “an attempt would be made to supply Fort
Sumter, peaceably
if they could, forcibly if they must.” Eight armed vessels with soldiers aboard
had been sent to sustain the notification, and moved so quickly on this
expedition that only an unexpected storm at sea caused delay enough for the
Confederate authorities to successfully meet the issue.
The Confederate States objected to
this movement of the Federal authorities, because the reinforcement was
invasion by the use of physical force; because it asserted the claim of the
United States to sovereignty over South Carolina, which was in dispute; and
because the supply of the garrison in Fort Sumter with necessary rations was
not the object nor the end of the expedition. The purpose was to secure Fort
Sumter, to close the port with the warships, to reduce Charleston by
bombardment if necessary, to land troops from transports, and thus crush the
rebellion [207] where it was supposed to have begun by overthrowing South
Carolina. This admirable scheme was frustrated by the necessary, prompt and
successful attack on Fort Sumter after General Beauregard had exchanged the
usual formalities with Major Anderson. At 4:30 o’clock on the morning of April
12th, the Confederates opened fire on the fort, which was soon returned. The
bombardment which followed for thirty-three hours at last made the fort
untenable, and Anderson on the 14th surrendered his stronghold to the
Confederacy, and on the 15th evacuated the position with honors.
It has been observed that at the
time of the sailing of the United States fleet toward Charleston under orders
to sustain Fort Sumter, neither of the two countries had armies and fleets in
readiness for the impending war. The Confederate government, having had only
two months of political existence, was yet scarcely in communication with the
seven States which had given it the right to a place among nations. Its armies
were a few thousand troops hastily gathered together from the seceded States,
and its navy had only a name with an abundance of splendid officers yearning
for ships. Seven great States of the South, Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee,
North Carolina, Virginia and Maryland, still remained in the Federal union. On
the Northern side the regular army had not been made available and the
volunteers were yet chiefly with their States. But the battle over the control
of Charleston Harbor, although fought by artillery and without the loss of
life, was followed by immediate and great preparations for the portentous
American conflict.
On the day after the plan of
reinforcement failed, President Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for 75,000
troops, to be immediately armed and equipped for active service. President
[Jefferson] Davis construed this to be a declaration of war, and called for 100,000
troops to support the independence of the South. The governors of six of the
[208] seven States which had not seceded refused to obey the requisitions upon
them for troops, because the proclamation established coercion as the policy of
the administration, and they would not participate in the subjugation of the
Southern States. [Governor Thomas Holliday Hicks] of Maryland merely asked for
delay. The “war governors” of the Northern States responded so earnestly to the
first call of President Lincoln that thousands of men who had been held in
preparation for this event began to pour toward Washington.
Quickly following the first
proclamation, President Lincoln on the 19th of April proclaimed the first
blockade of Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas, which was afterward
extended, April 27th, to the ports of North Carolina and Virginia. Another
proclamation, May 4th, called for about 40,000 volunteers for three years, and
ordered an increase of the Regular Army by 22,000 soldiers, and of the Navy by
18,000 seamen. Orders were also issued to seize all dispatches in telegraph
offices; to authorize martial law with suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
in certain places; to prohibit sales of munitions of war to Southern
States—these and other minor measures showing that actual war was at hand.
Under this policy Washington City became a military camp, and the frowning
visage of war was on all the country.
The unmistakable import of all
these coercive measures caused the secession of Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee and Arkansas; at the same time involving Missouri and Kentucky in
civil war, and causing the first blood of the great struggle to flow April 19th
on the soil of Maryland. Virginia seceding took possession of Harper’s Ferry
and the Gosport Navy Yard, thus acquiring a large amount of machinery and
munitions, but found Fortress Monroe so well garrisoned as to make its seizure
impossible. Virginia troops were rapidly organized by Major-General R. E. Lee,
and with such equipment as could be secured were posted at Harper’s Ferry,
Norfolk [209] and other points. The States seceding with her also occupied all
forts and arsenals they could seize, and began in earnest the organization of
military commands for the use of the Confederacy.
North Carolina was as loath as
Virginia to leave the Union, conservatively avoiding all acts that would place
the State in antagonism to the general government. Certain forts were seized by
a premature popular attack; but [Governor John Willis Ellis] caused them to be restored at once. Nothing warlike
occurred until the attempt was made by the reinforcement plan to put South
Carolina in peril, and the demand on the State to furnish its quota of troops
to put down the so-called rebellion. The governor declined to obey the
requisition and took the forts of the State, the arsenal at Fayetteville and
the mint at Charlotte into his possession. The State seceded May 10th, and
within a month raised a force of over 20,000 volunteers.
The great middle State of Tennessee
was so indispensable to the Confederacy that its tardy action produced alarm. [Governor
Isham Green Harris] urged immediate secession after
the fight over Sumter and President Lincoln’s call on Tennessee for troops, but
the State was hampered by the objection to secession which controlled almost
the entire eastern section. Prominent leaders of different parties joined the
governor, and at length, in May, the State agreed to enter into an alliance or
league with the Confederate government, placing under Confederate control the
entire military force, and the question of secession was submitted to the
people. This temporary action resulted in the legal secession of this invaluable
State and its incorporation with the body of the Confederacy. The governor
being authorized by the legislature rapidly organized a large provisional army.
Batteries were established on the Mississippi River, several thousand troops
were concentrated in West Tennessee, and others were posted in East Tennessee
and in camps at other places. Within two months after the passage of the act
[210] of May 6th, the energetic governor had put 30,000 troops in the field.
The State went at a bound to the front line of its associates.
THE SITUATION ON THE
BORDER AND IN THE WEST
A glance at the Western States at
this date shows that in the far northwest of the Confederacy war broke out
coincidently with the movements on the Atlantic side. Arkansas, at first indisposed
to join the Confederacy, took its place with the seceded States immediately
after coercion was inaugurated. [Governor Henry Massie Rector] answered Lincoln’s requisition
with a prompt reply on the 22nd of April that his State would furnish no troops
to subjugate the South. The State then seceded on the 6th of May, and its
convention authorized the raising of 60,000 soldiers. The arsenal at Little
Rock fell into the possession of State troops; Forts Smith, Pine Bluff and
Napoleon with their stores were seized and occupied; the organization of State
troops was effected with some rapidity, although no formidable invasion of the
State had occurred; and several commands were sent on to Virginia. The army of
the State was organized in two divisions, commanded by Generals [Ben] McCulloch and [Nicholas Bartlett] Pearce. With creditable energy Arkansas
put into line in the first year about 20,000 men, out of a total voting
population of about 50,000. Portions of these troops, marching to the support
of [Major-General Sterling] Price in Missouri, very greatly aided in
saving that State for the first year from Federal control. Later in the war its
men fought bravely in the general Confederate field from Maryland to Texas.
Missouri, which had given 148,000
votes against Lincoln and only 17,000 in his favor, and retained a bitter
memory of the Kansas troubles, was among the first of the Southern States to
suffer the distress of armed invasion. [Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson], in January, had declared for the
Union as long as it would observe the Constitution which created it, but
regarded coercion as an oppression which must [211] be resisted. The convention
which met first at Jefferson in February, and then at St. Louis in March, was
decidedly against immediate secession. After prolonged discussion it was
resolved that Missouri desired the perpetuity of the Union, that the Crittenden
resolutions made a good basis for adjusting all difficulties, and that Federal
troops should be withdrawn from forts where there was danger of collision, in
order to prevent civil war in the State. [Evans here is referring to two
documents. The first is the Crittenden Compromise, a complex prewar proposal by
Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky which sought to
preserve the Union by guaranteeing the permanence of slavery. The Compromise
was voted down in the Senate. The second is the Crittenden-Johnson Resolution, a document approved by Congress
which stated that the North’s purpose in waging war was not to destroy slavery
but to preserve the Union.] With exceeding caution, justified, as many of its
public men thought, by its specially endangered position, Missouri moved at
first with an earnest purpose to prevent the horrors of war.
But war was not only inevitable; it
was at hand. The fateful proclamation of the President of the United States
seemed to Governor Jackson to start a civil war and to precede a consolidated
despotism—and he said so; but he counseled the legislature to take no
precipitate and passionate step. Great excitement was caused by the warlike
news from Washington City, amidst which arms were secretly conveyed out of
Missouri from the unprotected arsenal at St. Louis and delivered into the
keeping of hostile parties at Springfield, Illinois. This abstraction of arms,
with which the forces of the State might have been equipped, and the surrender
of Camp Jackson, at the same date, caused an alarm
that precipitated the passage by the legislature of the pending military bill,
which authorized the governor to equip the military and take command in person,
so as to suppress riots and insurrections in the State.
General [William Selby] Harney, of the Federal army, came to St.
Louis April 15th, assumed command of the military department, and agreed with
Major-General [Sterling] Price, representing the governor, upon a plan to
preserve the peace, which proved futile because it was disapproved at
Washington. Another attempt at agreement, proposed by Governor Jackson, was
made June 11th, in which he and General Price acted for Missouri, while [Francis] P. Blair and General [212] [Nathaniel] Lyon represented the United States. This also failing, the
governor issued his proclamation on the 12th of June, describing his
extraordinary efforts to avoid war, and the causes of their failure, and at the
same time called for 50,000 men “for the purpose of repelling invasion and for
the protection of the lives, liberty and property of the citizens.”
General Lyon had insisted, in the
peace conference with Jackson and Price, on the complete occupation of the
State by the military forces of the United States, in order to reduce it, as
avowed by himself, “to the exact condition of Maryland,” and on the governor’s
rejection of these terms prepared at once to overthrow the State government by
his military force. The day following the governor’s proclamation, Lyon moved
with 1,500 men from St. Louis upon Jefferson City, which he seized, and
proceeded toward Booneville, where he was met in battle by the governor, who
with Colonel [John S.] Marmaduke had collected a small body of
Missourians. The affair was small in casualties, but signified fully that the
Federal government was resolved on the conquest of the State. After this there
was rapid increase of military events. June was consumed in recruiting and
marching to positions. The Federals had gained great advantage in the prolonged
negotiations for peace, during which the increasing and arming of commands went
on. The adjoining State of Illinois also stood prepared to throw 10,000 troops
across the State lines on any day. Lyon sent out many scouting parties and
various expeditions which harassed Missouri. Many small encounters occurred,
and one of larger measure at Carthage, where General Price, with General
[James S.] Rains and Governor Jackson, defeated [Franz]
Sigel on the 5th
of July. About a month later Lyon lost his life in battle at Wilson’s Creek, or Oak Hills, in which Price and
McCulloch, with Missouri and Arkansas regiments, won a Confederate victory. The
situation in Missouri at this period, while the First Battle of Manassas [213] was taking place in
Virginia, shows that military operations were in hot progress in the Far West;
but the general view here taken of the border States in these first months of
the war as they were related to the entire field of operations, requires a
change of attention from this interesting stage of Missouri’s affairs, to take
into consideration the opening of the war in Kentucky.
Kentucky’s attitude in the general
convulsion of the country was very much like that of Missouri and Maryland. In
all public expressions by conventions and popular assemblies, Kentucky spoke
unitedly the aversion of the people to war and a purpose to abide the
administration of President Lincoln unless coercion and subjugation became his
manifest policy. Crittenden, her distinguished and venerable Senator, had
declared Kentucky’s position in the celebrated resolutions which the United
States Congress had rejected. Yet, after the demand for troops to be furnished
by the State to subjugate the South, Kentucky was in a dilemma. April and May
were passed by the people in a condition of general alarm, and at the end of this
waiting it was found that the neutrality which they had hoped for had been made
impossible. Already had the agents of the Federal government made large
enlistments in the army. An encampment of Federal soldiers had been established
under Nelson on Kentucky ground, and Governor [Beriah Magoffin’s] petition to President Lincoln for their removal
had been not only refused, but with the refusal he declined to entertain
Kentucky’s plea for neutrality. President Davis had replied to the governor’s
letter on the neutrality question that his government would respect Kentucky’s
desire, provided such neutrality were strictly observed toward both parties.
But even during this correspondence the northern borders were occupied by
Federal volunteers, while near the southern line Confederate forces were
camping, and within the State the young men were dividing in hostile camps.
[214] Military operations began in
western Virginia immediately after the secession of the State. The political
movement made in May to cut a new State out of the western side of Virginia,
was encouraged by a prompt gathering of United States troops in Ohio and
Pennsylvania. General [George B.] McClellan, the commanding general of the
department, moved across the Ohio early in May, and with [William Starke] Rosecrans began a military occupation of
this part of Virginia. Governor [John] Letcher met the movement by forwarding such troops as could
be spared, and the Confederate government, taking upon itself the defense of
this region, sent General [Henry Alexander] Wise into the Kanawha Valley and
commissioned General [John Buchanan] Floyd to raise a brigade in southwest
Virginia to co-operate with Wise. Colonel [George Alexander] Porterfield, commanding a small body of
Confederates, was also sent to seize the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, but his
force was inadequate to the task. [General Robert Selden] Garnett and [Lieutenant Colonel John] Pegram, overmatched by Rosecrans and
McClellan, were forced away from the mountain positions they had attempted to
hold. The Confederates won in several affairs, but the day went against them at
Philippi, June 3d; Rich Mountain, July 11th, and Corrick’s Ford, July 13th. As the outcome of
these combats the Federals under McClellan held military control of
northwestern Virginia, and this important left flank of the Confederate general
line of defense was broken down as early as the 15th of July.
The military situation in Maryland,
another of the States lying between the South and the armies of invasion, may
be considered here in association with the state of affairs in Missouri,
Kentucky and western Virginia. It is doubtless true that Maryland would have
decided to unite with the Confederate States if the question had been left to
the free action of its people. Its importance to the Confederacy was not
exceeded by that of any other State. Unfortunately, the Confederate government
was not able to occupy this valuable ally at once, and it fell [215] quickly
into the firm grasp of the Federal forces. Across the route on which the troops
called for by Lincoln’s proclamation were to march to Washington, lay this
southern commonwealth pleading like Kentucky and Missouri for neutrality and
imploring the stay of the threatening conflict. Maryland asked that her soil be
relieved from the odium of being the passage ground of troops called to invade
Virginia and the South. The reasonable request was refused, and on the 19th of
April a body of Federal troops on the way to Washington landed in Baltimore, marched through its streets and
encountered an excited population. Mutual firing ensued, during which the first
blood of the Southern revolution was shed. The event startled the
administration at Washington and caused a temporary apparent change of policy,
but within a few days it became clear that Maryland was to be devoted to
complete subjugation. General [Benjamin] Butler, placed in command to execute this policy, began by
fortifying the position at the Relay House, and on the 5th of May took military
possession of Baltimore and converted it into a military encampment. Civil
authority was entirely overthrown, arrests of officials and citizens followed,
and the State government was subverted.
THE FIRST GREAT
MOVEMENT AGAINST RICHMOND
The Confederate government was
transferred from Montgomery to Richmond in May, from which situation, fronting
Washington, it began preparations to meet the invasion of Virginia by the great
force gathering on the Potomac, and to counteract the operations by sea and
land which threatened the southern coast and the western borders. The Tredegar
foundry was converted into a manufactory of guns, the machinery obtained at
Harper’s Ferry was sent to Fayetteville and Richmond where it could be used in
making arms, small foundries were put into service wherever they could be
established, powder works were erected, and, in general statement, the [216] administration
at Richmond, aided by all the Confederate States, most actively worked all
plans to secure that equipment for its armies, which were now eagerly pressing
into the field of action unarmed, and insufficiently equipped. With remarkable
celerity the volunteers from the Northern States assembled at or near
Washington, and were organized into several armies of invasion. During the
latter part of April and May the War Department of the United States was busy
in receiving and equipping for battle the regiments which the “war governors”
were sending forward. By the last of June the great armies were ready to move.
McClellan commanded in western Virginia; along the upper Potomac, with
headquarters at Williamsport, General [Robert] Patterson was ready to advance against Joseph E. Johnston;
Butler was at Fortress Monroe, and [General Irvin] McDowell at Washington with the main body. These troops were
disposed under their various commanders in one general line fronting Virginia
and extending from the Ohio River through western Virginia and Maryland, at
Washington, along the left bank of the Potomac, and to Fortress
Monroe. The entire
force, containing in round numbers 100,000 men, was thoroughly well provided
with all the munitions necessary to successful war. The Confederate line of
defense matched this Federal line at all points except in numbers and
munitions. In western Virginia the total Confederate force was about 5,000; General
Joseph E. Johnston in the Valley with 15,000 faced Patterson; Beauregard,
commanding the principal Confederate army of 20,000, was at Manassas; and
besides these were the divisions under [General Theophilus H.] Holmes on the lower Potomac, and the
commands of [Generals John B.] Magruder and [Benjamin] Huger at Yorktown and Norfolk. The
entire Confederate strength on this long defensive line was about 65, 000.
The Federal preparations were
complete in July, and the plan of operation against the Confederate defenses
had been discussed and determined. Among the several [217] lines of advance
discussed, that which kept Washington best protected was adopted. It was
determined to overthrow Beauregard at Manassas and then march on rapidly to
Richmond. With this in view the army of McDowell marched into Virginia, drove
back the Confederates at Fairfax Court House, and on the 18th skirmished so
successfully as to alarm General Beauregard concerning the right flank of his
army. While McDowell was thus pressing Beauregard, Patterson marched against
Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, with instructions to reinforce McDowell as
soon as he had succeeded in forcing Johnston to retreat across the Blue ridge.
Butler, operating from Fortress Monroe, was also charged with the defeat of the
Confederate forces on the peninsula.
But while Patterson was attempting
to execute his part of the plan, Johnston eluded him and marched directly to
the help of Beauregard, arriving on the 10th. General [Thomas J. “Stonewall”] Jackson reached the field with his
brigade, and other Confederate regiments under General Holmes were rapidly
added to Beauregard’s small army. Beauregard was now better prepared for that
dangerous assault which McDowell made early in the morning of the 21st of July,
bringing on the great historical battle of Bull Run or First Manassas. The first Federal attacks of the
day were so successful as to inspire sanguine expectations. Telegrams of progressive
triumphs poured from the battlefield into Washington, and from that city were
distributed throughout the United States. But the Confederate divisions were
handled with matchless skill by their many experienced officers, and though
volunteers recently enlisted, they fought with the steadiness of trained men.
They rallied from their several defeats during the morning, resuming their
fight from time to time until in the afternoon their courage and fortitude were
rewarded by a most remarkable victory. The Federal divisions were driven from
the field by impetuous but well directed Confederate attacks. The defeated regiments
were [218] broken into fragments of companies, and at length the defeat grew
into a rout of the grand army that had marched into Virginia with great
confidence in the power of their numbers to make one effective blow that would “end
the war in sixty days.”
NEXT AFTER MANASSAS
The condition of McDowell’s army as
it fled in tatters back to the Potomac, praying for the privilege of being once
more in camp behind the defenses of Washington, will not be herein described.
The courage of the several great Northern armies which struggled often and long
with the Army of Northern Virginia, will never be questioned by
Confederate soldiers, and Southern historians may leave to others the task of
criticizing the men of McDowell who in this first trial battle were beaten back
to the lines from which they had advanced. The engagement at Manassas was
simply an indisputable Confederate victory, won by the superior leadership of
great generals sustained through the vicissitudes of a whole day’s hot
encounters by the courage and endurance of the South’s fresh-fighting volunteer
soldiers. It marked with a very decided emphasis the first stage in the march
of events, giving the South renewed confidence in success, exciting the North
to increased determination to conquer, and casting Europe into doubt as to the
end of the struggle between the two sections of the Union.
Immediately after the battle the
Confederate Congress authorized the raising of 400,000 soldiers, and the issue
of $100,000,000 treasury notes. The army at Manassas Junction collected
thousands of small-arms, thirty cannon, wagons, mules, horses and army supplies
of all kinds which the enemy left on the battlefield. The Southern States at
once accepted with greater readiness the companies and regiments which had been
enthusiastically tendered for immediate service. The United States Congress on
its part demanded a call for 500,000 men, [219] and authorized the government
to raise $500,000,000 to carry on the war. General McClellan was called from western
Virginia to take command of the Army of the Potomac, and his acknowledged skill as an
organizer was soon thoroughly tested by the pressure of great bodies of
soldiers forwarded to his department. For months his work consisted in
preparing an army which he desired to be invincible, and his government sought
to gratify his desire. Before the end of the winter, 200,000 well equipped
soldiers constituted the Army of the Potomac, for the protection of Washington
and invasion of Virginia.
On the 1st of July, 1861, the total
Federal force stationed at all points was computed as 307,875 men, and after
deducting the 77,875 three months’ men, there still remained at the command of
the government about 230,000 soldiers. This total was increased by the 1st of
December, according to the estimate of the War Department, to 660,971
volunteers and regulars, divided among the armies and navies of the east and
the west.
The Confederate authorities, seeing
the indisposition of McClellan to make any early advance on Richmond in the
fall and winter of 1861, undertook to reorganize the armies of the Confederacy
and increase their strength in all respects. The same Federal inaction also
permitted an attempt to recover the ground lost in western Virginia. Battles of
a minor character were fought in that region, at Grafton, Cross Lanes, Carnifex Ferry, Cheat Mountain and other places, but the
Confederates failed to establish their control over this section. Accordingly
the greater part of the forces engaged in the effort was withdrawn and sent to
other fields.
In the western field, after the
defeat of Lyon, [General Stirling] Price and [Ben] McCulloch united their
commands at Wilson’s Creek, Missouri; Price moved against [General James A.] Mulligan’s division at Lexington, and compelled his surrender
of 3,500 men with their arms and supplies, after which the great Missouri
chieftain [220] foiled [General John C.] Fremont and occupied Springfield. The Battle of Belmont, in the lower part of the State, went against the
Confederate general at first, but in the end the Federal general, Ulysses S. Grant, was compelled to take the shelter of his gunboats.
The activity of military operations in Missouri during the year 1861, beginning
with the affair at Boonville in June, is shown by the record of
fifty-two battles, besides many unmentioned small encounters, fought on its
soil during the first year of the war.
The fighting in Kentucky in 1861
did not begin until September, and has been regarded as of slight moment; yet
in that year there were over twelve engagements of considerable importance. The
Home Guards, formed for State protection, furnished a considerable number of
men for the Confederate as well as the Federal army, and many Kentuckians went
singly or in groups to various Southern commands. The Confederate forces
occupied Columbus, on the Mississippi River, in September, at the time General
Grant, then commanding at Cairo, took possession of Paducah. General [Felix] Zollicoffer, with a brigade of infantry and cavalry, entered the
southeastern part of the State in September and became engaged in several
affairs at Barbourville, Wild Cat and elsewhere with troops from
Ohio and Indiana. General [William “Bull”] Nelson, who had been made useful in
organizing Federal troops in Kentucky, operated in the eastern part of that
State. In September, a considerable body of Federal troops from Ohio, Indiana
and Illinois occupied St. Louis. About the same time, Anderson, who had
commanded at Fort Sumter, was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers in the
Federal army and assigned to command of the Department of Kentucky. He was
succeeded by General [William Tecumseh] Sherman. General [Simon Bolivar] Buckner commanded the Confederates at
Bowling Green, and General [Leonidas] Polk was assigned to the “Department of the West.’ The
Federal forces in Kentucky were increased before the end of the year, until
[221] they were estimated at 60,000. This large body of troops came from
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Pennsylvania,
except about 20,000, which had been raised in Kentucky. The Confederate forces
in the State were computed at about 25,000.
In the middle of the winter,
January 10, 1862, the Confederate General [Humphrey] Marshall was compelled to fall back from
the northeast of Kentucky, and subsequently [General George B.] Crittenden and Zollicoffer were forced to
retreat across the Cumberland. President Davis wrote of this affair as “the
most serious defeat that we had hitherto met. It broke the right of our
defensive line and involved the loss of eastern Kentucky.”
In Maryland the Federal military
forces held the State in a duress from which the only way of escape was across
the Potomac into Virginia, through which many gallant young Marylanders entered
the Confederate service.
NAVAL OPERATIONS.
While McClellan was fully occupied
in increasing the defenses around Washington and forming the great army which
was designed to crush its way through Virginia, the earliest special movements of
the season, directed by the War and Navy Departments, were along the extensive
southern coast line. Fortress Monroe was reinforced until it was impregnable.
Fort Hatteras, in North Carolina, was taken from the Confederates in August,
and Port Royal, in South Carolina, was seized in November. Another of the
series of expeditions designed for the conquest of the coast region had for its
object the Gulf shore between New Orleans and Mobile, and succeeded in securing
a position on Ship Island. The general blockade was strengthened by these
operations, and although not strictly effective its injurious effects began to
be seriously felt throughout the Confederacy.
[222] CLOSE OF THE
FIRST YEAR OF WAR
It may now be seen that at the
close of the first year of Mr. Davis’ administration the Confederacy, which had
begun its career with seven States, had gained the almost untrammeled accession
of the great States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the
earnest support of a large part of Kentucky and Missouri. Civil government
under constitutional provisions was established and operating throughout these
States without hindrance, except in localities where the Federal forces had
obtained lodgment. Armies had been raised to the computed number of 315,000
volunteers, whose equipment had been the chief difficulty, and even that
obstacle had been met by an energetic use of resources which enabled the
government to withstand the first assault of coercion. A navy had been created,
and a system of privateering instituted which produced considerable derangement
of the United States commerce. Manufactories for all kinds of military supplies
were erected in many sections, and home agricultural productions were
sufficient for the needs of the people and the armies. The South has never made
a better exhibit of the energy and ingenuity of its people and the resources of
its land than in this exposition of 1861. It now began, in February, 1862, the
second year of the struggle for independence, with still the odds against it of
four to one in population and greater disadvantages in general means.
THE GENERAL ARRAY OF
FORCES EARLY IN 1862
The Federal lines covering the land
borders of the Confederacy, extending from the mouth of the Chesapeake and
passing by the amply protected capital, ran through Maryland, West Virginia,
Kentucky, Missouri and on to the mouth of the Rio Grande. At Fortress Monroe,
under Butler and [John E.] Wool, were 15,000 men; on the southern
Potomac, [Joseph] Hooker’s division of 10,000; immediately
in charge of Washington, 160,000 men under McClellan; [223] in the Shenandoah Valley,
[Nathaniel P.] Banks with 16,000, and Rosecrans in
western Virginia with 20,000. General [Don Carlos] Buell had united the scattered Federal forces in Kentucky
into an army of 100,000, and [General Henry W.] Halleck was in Missouri with a similar number. A force of
20,000 was put in readiness to operate from Kansas to the Gulf of Mexico, and
another army was assembled at Cairo under Generals Grant and [Charles Ferguson] Smith to campaign in co-operation with
gunboats along the Mississippi and Cumberland Rivers.
The United States naval operations
in the beginning of the second year of the invasion contemplated the blockade
of the entire coast, so as to cut off the communications of the Confederacy
with other nations. The reduction of all ports, and their occupation by the
military as points from which various overland incursions might be made, was
also a part of the general plan. For these purposes several squadrons were
organized—the North Atlantic, Admiral [Louis M.] Goldsborough, on the Virginia and North
Carolina coasts; the South Atlantic, Admiral [Samuel Francis] DuPont, covering South Carolina, Georgia
and northeast Florida; the Eastern Gulf, Flag Officer [William Wister] McKean, and the Western Gulf, Admiral [David] Farragut, on the Gulf Coast. Three flotillas were employed—the
Potomac, Commodore [Andrew A.] Hardwood; the James River, Commodore [Charles] Wilkes, and the Mississippi, Admiral [Andrew Hull] Foote—each of which operated as its name indicates. The
numbers of vessels in service were about 250 steamers carrying 1,500 guns, and 100
sailing vessels—frigates, sloops-of-war, mortar fleets, barks, brigs and
ships—with 1,400 guns.
The Confederate States confronted
this formidable array of military and naval forces with a general long interior
line. At Norfolk and Yorktown were a small force of infantry, well-fortified,
and some vessels of the little navy. The main army in Virginia rested its right
on the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and stretching its fortified line by
Centerville and Manassas rested the left in the mountains beyond Leesburg. Beyond
[224] this point there were other brigades at Martinsburg, Winchester and in
parts of western Virginia. This long line was under the command of General
Joseph E. Johnston and confronted McClellan. In Kentucky the Confederate
divisions were chiefly in the lower half of the State, from Bowling Green to
Columbus, also occupying Forts Donelson
and Henry. The main army in Missouri,
commanded by Price, was stationed near Springfield, facing the Federal forces,
whose headquarters was at St. Louis. In Tennessee the Confederate troops were
encamped preparatory to active campaigning at various positions, including
Cumberland Gap, Chattanooga, Nashville and Memphis. Fort Pillow, Island No. 10 and Vicksburg were occupied with
strong defensive works, and in Arkansas the military of that State were posted
so as to operate with Price, or be sent into Tennessee. Thus the eastern and
northern fronts of the Confederacy were curtained with the Southern armies to
resist the threatening advances of the Federals.
Turning attention from these to the
Southern coast line, the defenses are found to consist of well-fortified
positions defending the harbors, and small but vigorous fleets that had been
rapidly constructed. Confederate privateers were also boldly adventuring on the
seas and doing great damage to the shipping of the enemy.
MOVEMENT ALL ALONG
THE LINES
The extensive preparations made by
the Federal government for the second grand movement for the conquest of the
Southern States became so satisfactory to President Lincoln that he issued on
the 27th of January, from the Executive mansion, the following unique order,
containing some unusual dramatic features:
Executive Mansion, Washington,
January 27, 1862.
President’s General War Order, No.
I.
Ordered, That the 22d day of
February, 1862, be the [225] day for a general movement of the land and naval
forces of the United States against the insurgent forces:
That, especially, The army at and
about Fortress Monroe, The Army of the Potomac, The Army of Western Virginia, The army near Munfordville, Kentucky,
The army and flotilla at Cairo, And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico be
ready for a movement on that day;
That other forces, both land and
naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and
be ready to obey additional orders when duly given; That the heads of departments,
and especially the secretaries of war and of the navy, with all their
subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and
subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict
and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
This peculiar order, issued early
after [Edwin] Stanton’s accession to the office of War Secretary,
and in the midst of winter, betrayed the impatience as well as the satisfaction
of the President, and possibly was chiefly aimed at McClellan, the
general-in-chief, who was strenuously devoting himself to the preparation of an
army which could defeat the Confederates under Johnston and capture Richmond.
The Federal forces in the West began to move about the 1st of February, without
waiting for the President’s appointed time to arrive. Buell made an attempt to
enter east Tennessee, but being diverted from that purpose concentrated near
Munfordville. The military forces in Halleck’s department, with the gunboats
designed for an expedition on the Tennessee River, all under command of General
Grant, also responded to War Order No. 1 in advance of the designated date.
This movement, made first against Fort Henry, resulted in the fall of that work
on February 6th, and the surrender of Fort Donelson about ten days later. Nashville,
necessarily [226] next abandoned by the Confederates, was occupied by Buell,
while Grant moved his own army to Pittsburg Landing, near the border of the
State of Mississippi.
The new Confederate line, which
these Federal successes required, extended from New Madrid on the left through
Corinth as the center to Murfreesboro on the right. The Confederate leaders at
Richmond were shocked by these reverses that imperiled the West, but immediate
preparations were made to relieve the situation. Amidst such startling events
the electoral votes were counted that made [Jefferson] Davis President under
the permanent constitution, and on the 22d day of February he was formally
installed in office. The governors of the Gulf and Western States renewed their
calls for troops, to which a patriotic response was readily made. The South was
still confident of final success.
Meantime, Price, [Earl] Van Dorn and McCulloch in the West were contending valiantly
against the superior forces under [Samuel Ryan] Curtis and Sigel, but without being able to recover
Missouri. Looking to the Atlantic coast in February, [Ambrose] Burnside was observed commanding a naval expedition with
military support sufficient to capture Roanoke Island, New Bern
and Fort Macon, in North Carolina, while DuPont
seized Fernandina and Jacksonville in Florida. Preparations were in progress to
capture Fort Pulaski on the coast of Georgia, and the
harbor of Brunswick was entered by a Federal fleet. New Orleans and Mobile, and
the Gulf landings generally, were kept in a state of alarm by the
demonstrations made by the constantly increasing numbers of Federal vessels at
Ship Island. Texas was not yet seriously involved except in the contributions
of thousands of Texans to the Confederate armies, but a Federal fleet under
Commander [Henry] Eagle appeared before Galveston preparing to demand its surrender.
[227] THE SUCCESSFUL
DEFENSE OF RICHMOND
Thus far the Federal advances are
seen to have been made with great vigor in the West and on the coast, but on
the eastern side of the widely spread battlefield, where the Confederacy was
fighting for life, the Federal operations were not so rapid nor so successful.
The Confederates were permitted to occupy and use the Navy yard at Norfolk, and
not only raise the Merrimac, which
the Federals sank when they abandoned Norfolk in April, 1861, but to change it
into a dangerous ironclad. On the morning of March 8, 1862, this novel vessel,
rebuilt by Southern ingenuity upon a novel plan and named the Virginia, steamed away to attack the
Federal war vessels lying in Hampton Roads. In the fight which followed
between the Virginia and the United
States vessels the entire Federal fleet was scattered except the Cumberland, which was sunk, the Congress burned, and the Minnesota run aground. During the night
after this battle the Monitor, a new Federal ironclad, also just
completed, came into the roads, and taking position between the Minnesota and the Virginia, received next day the blows of the Confederate vessels
without being harmed, and returned dangerous shots from its revolving iron
turrets. This duel of the ironclads, although nearly harmless to either,
aroused the attention of both nations to the value of this class of boats, and
the opportune arrival of the Monitor
probably protected the ships of the enemy from destruction.
General McClellan gave the
Confederate government time during the fall and winter after the battle of
Manassas to enlarge the army and navy and increase the strength of the
fortifications around Richmond. His antagonist, General Joseph E. Johnston,
with an army very much inferior in numbers, covered Washington for months,
awaiting the renewal of the invasion. On the 10th of March, McClellan’s armies
began to move toward Richmond, and the Confederates were withdrawn from [228]
the advanced position near Washington to the Rappahannock. On the 9th the
Confederate army was entirely gone from its former position at Manassas, and on
the next day McClellan moved toward the deserted entrenchments. A few days
later his army changed direction and was massed near Alexandria. From this
place it was transferred entire, except McDowell’s corps, to Fortress Monroe,
to begin the Peninsula Campaign.
McClellan’s plans were not
satisfactory to the Washington management of the war, because it began to
appear from the movements of Stonewall Jackson in the [Shenandoah] Valley that
the city had been left without sufficient protection. Moved by this fear,
McDowell, with 30,000 men, was temporarily retained on the Potomac, but
McClellan’s command still consisted of nearly 100,000 total, before which the
Confederate force at Yorktown, after delaying the Federals awhile, retired, and
Norfolk was necessarily abandoned.
The first of the series of battles
between the two armies after Johnston had fallen back, was fought at Williamsburg on the 5th of May, and the next at
Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. In this latter
battle, of May 31st and June 1st, the Confederates shattered the left wing of
the Federal line, capturing 6,000 muskets, ten guns and a large number of
prisoners. General Johnston was severely wounded and General Robert E. Lee was
assigned to the command of the army. This victory of the Confederates under
General Johnston refreshed the spirit of his army and the appointment of Lee at
this critical moment increased the Southern confidence. McClellan was checked
for the time by the defeat at Seven Pines, which proved to be the prelude of
his many reverses.
IN THE WEST, APRIL
AND MAY, 1862
The Confederate armies in the West,
commanded by Beauregard and Albert Sidney Johnston, were struggling through
April and May to sustain the Confederacy [229] against the armies of Halleck’s
department, while their comrades were as bravely resisting the Federals under
McClellan. During the first days of April, when McClellan was slowly forcing
the Confederate position at Yorktown, the two military leaders in the West,
provoked by the disasters of the preceding months, moved their armies from
Corinth to attack Grant and Sherman at Shiloh.
Their assault was made immediately on reaching the enemy with such persisting
vigor on the first day, April 6th, that the army of Grant was beaten from the
field; but the great victory cost the Confederacy the loss of Albert Sidney
Johnston’s life. The night screened the defeated Federals, the battle ceased,
the reinforcements of Buell were hurried to Grant’s relief, and on the next
day, after a resolute defense against the attack of these new forces, the
wearied and unsupported Confederate victors of the day before were withdrawn
from the field, taking with them hundreds of captured muskets, thirty cannon
and nearly 3,000 prisoners. In this battle—one of the engagements that
contributed largely to the final result—40,000 Confederates engaged the first
day 44,000 Federals; and on the second day the reinforcements of the Federals
were sufficient to maintain their first numbers, while the Confederates were
reduced by all casualties about one-fourth and were without reserves. It is
estimated that on the second day 45,000 was the total of Grant’s strength,
opposed by less than 30,000 effective Confederates.
The battle of Shiloh, taken into a
view that embraces the positions of both armies at the close of the first day
and the condition of both after the battle was ended, is properly written down
among Confederate victories. It is placed among the engagements on which
Confederate fate was suspended, only because the victory was not so complete as
to enable the Confederates to regain the command of Fort Donelson and the
possession of all Tennessee and Kentucky. Beauregard, succeeding the fallen
[230] Johnston, could only take his army unopposed back to Corinth, and Grant
could only pause on the battlefield where the fierce fight had raged and inform
Halleck, “It is unsafe to remain many weeks without reinforcements.” Halleck
arrived on the ground ten days after the battle and said to Grant, “Your army
is not now in condition to resist attack.”
Beauregard’s army was strengthened
at Corinth by reinforcements from Trans-Mississippi, but it was again rapidly
reduced by sickness. Unable to stand against the reinforced armies which
Halleck at length brought against him, he retreated safely to Tupelo, where on
June 17th his own sickness caused him to turn over the command to General
Braxton Bragg.
During the first months of 1862 the
entire area of the Confederacy appears as a great field of general battle. In
Arkansas the State military were contending against the raids of the Federal
General Curtis. John Morgan, with his cavalry, was endeavoring
to open the way for the recovery of Kentucky by the Confederates. New Orleans had
been forced to surrender to Farragut, and was placed under the military command
of General Benjamin F. Butler. Memphis also was captured by the Federals, and
the control of the Mississippi River was divided. Fort Pulaski, near the mouth of the Savannah River,
was taken in April. Numerous incursions, raids and skirmishes, occurring in all
directions, accompanied the more massive operations of the great armies.
STONEWALL JACKSON IN
THE VALLEY
General McClellan’s plan of
campaign was to enlarge and equip an army for an advance against Richmond which
would be so powerful as to be unaffected in its movements by any diversion the
Confederate government could make, but the operations of Stonewall Jackson in
the [Shenandoah] Valley of Virginia became an interference
at the beginning and an obstacle in the end, which contributed [231] to the
defeat of the main movement. With a few thousand men this remarkable military
genius forced the management at Washington to consider him at every turn of
affairs. Although repulsed now and then, his subsequent maneuvers caused the
employment of great numbers of the enemy in chasing him, a chasing that led
them to defeat. The forces of [James] Shields, [Robert Huston] Milroy, Fremont, [Robert C.] Schenck and Banks felt his power in several encounters, and
it was the defeat of these generals while McClellan was moving away from
Washington that alarmed the administration. The orders to protect Washington
became more stringent, and while they were in process of execution by a
concentration of Federal troops in Luray Valley, Jackson suddenly and rapidly
moved to the vicinity of Richmond.
While Jackson was closing up his
series of brilliant actions by the signal defeat of Shields at Port Republic and marching his victorious
regiments toward the army of Lee, J.E.B. Stuart
rode around the army of McClellan, and returning in safety with many prisoners
as Jackson approached, joined in the battles around Richmond, which began with Mechanicsville and ended at Malvern Hill.
On the day after the battle of
Seven Pines, General Robert E. Lee, who since March 13th had had control of the
military operations of all the Confederate armies, was directed by President
Davis to take personal command of the army then defending Richmond. Under his
skillful directions the fortifications around the Confederate capital had been
made strong, and on assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia he
proceeded at once to make its position secure against attack, and “to enhance
its efficiency and strength by every means in his power, so as to justify
aggressive movements.”
According to an estimate of the
strength of the Army of Northern Virginia at the beginning of the Seven Days’ Battles, made in the office of the adjutant-general [232]
from the army field returns, Lee began the battle of Cold Harbor, June 27th, with 73,000 infantry,
3,000 cavalry and 4,000 artillery. These numbers included the divisions of G.W. Smith, [James] Longstreet, Magruder, D.H. Hill,
A.P. Hill, Stonewall Jackson, Huger, [William H.C.] Whiting, [Richard S.] Ewell and Holmes, comprising thirty-nine brigades of
infantry besides Stuart’s cavalry and the artillery, making a total strength,
in all arms, of 80,000. General Lee stated in November, 1865, that the estimate
made in the adjutant-general’s office at Richmond of the Confederate strength
at the chief battles, appeared to him to be larger than the true number.
General Early placed Lee’s strength under 80,000 effectives. Colonel [Walter H.] Taylor, after elaborate calculations, stated the number at
80,835.
The official returns of McClellan’s
armies show that at the beginning of the battles around Richmond there were
present for duty 115,249 men. This superior force, equipped with whatsoever a
powerful government could furnish, had reached a position within 4 miles of
Richmond, only to be driven back to the James River with a loss of nearly
20,000. Transferred thence, under a quick change of commanders from McClellan
to [John] Pope, it attempted another advance,
with the hope of a change from defeat to victory, but only to be vanquished
again at Cedar Mountain and Manassas Junction, after which, early in September,
the great army under the boastful Pope took refuge again within the
fortifications about the capital of the United States.
AFFAIRS IN MISSISSIPPI,
TENNESSEE AND KENTUCKY
While these great military events
were occurring in Virginia, General Bragg’s army was at Tupelo; Van Dorn and
Price were operating in Mississippi; Kirby Smith
was in east Tennessee, and the cavalry of [Joseph] Wheeler, [Nathan Bedford] Forrest and Morgan were advancing into
Tennessee and Kentucky.
[233] After Shiloh, all events
began to point to a general Confederate triumph, and when the summer ended the
Confederate armies were marching into Kentucky under Bragg and Smith, and into
Maryland under Lee. Cheered by success the Confederate people indulged the hope
that recognition of their independence would soon be their reward for all their
sacrifices.
Bragg moved his army, early in
July, to Chattanooga, and joining Smith projected an advance into middle
Tennessee and Kentucky. With the divisions of [Patrick R.] Cleburne and [Thomas James] Churchill, Smith routed the Federals at
Richmond, Kentucky, and reinforced by [Henry]
Heth moved into
Lexington. Bragg, with Polk and [William Joseph] Hardee, marched out of Chattanooga with
30,000 men, and entering Kentucky September 5th, the date of Lee’s advance into
Maryland, captured a garrison of 4,000 men at Munfordville on September 17th, the date of the
Battle of Sharpsburg [Antietam]. After this successful achievement
he occupied Frankfort, the capital of Kentucky.
The Federal General [Don Carlos] Buell
followed these Confederate armies, gathering reinforcements as he went, and forced
the Battle of Perryville, October 8th, which was well
fought on both sides, but the disparity of numbers was greatly against Bragg,
his effective strength being reported at 16,000 and the Federal force in active
battle at about 24,000. Bragg, in his retreat, perfected his junction with
Kirby Smith at Harrodsburg, as he originally intended, and awaited there a
Federal attack, which Buell did not choose to make. Bragg soon gave up Kentucky
and concentrated his forces at Murfreesboro in Tennessee. General Wheeler, who
was the active leader of the cavalry in this campaign, says that the “two
months of battles and marches by the armies of Bragg and Smith cost the
Federals a loss in killed, wounded and prisoners of 26,530. We captured 35
cannon, 16,000 stand of arms, millions of rounds of ammunition, 1,700 mules,
300 wagons loaded with military stores and 2,000 [234] horses. We recovered
Cumberland Gap and redeemed middle Tennessee and north Alabama.”
LEE’S MARCH INTO
MARYLAND, SEPTEMBER, 1862
Lee’s plan for his northward
advance included the capture of Harper’s Ferry and a general engagement in
Maryland, in which he expected to be successful. He crossed the Potomac on
September 5th, and unexpectedly a portion of his command fought some severe
battles at South Mountain, while Jackson compelled the
surrender of the large Federal command at Harper’s Ferry. On the 15th, when near Antietam,
he confronted McClellan, who had again been called to command of the Federal
army, succeeding General Pope. The Battle of Sharpsburg [Antietam] ensued. Lee’s entire strength in
this bloody engagement has been carefully computed by Colonel [Walter H.] Taylor at 35,255 of all arms, and General McClellan states
in his official report that his command was 87,164 of all arms. “Those 35,000 Confederates,”
says Colonel Taylor in his Four
Years with General Lee,
“were the very flower of the Army of Northern Virginia, who with indomitable
courage and inflexible tenacity wrestled for the mastery in the ratio of one to
three of their adversaries, and with consummate skill they were maneuvered from
point to point, as different parts of the line of battle were in turn assailed
with the greatest impetuosity. At times it appeared as if disaster was
inevitable; but succor never failed, and night found Lee’s lines unbroken and
his army still defiant.” McClellan says of his command at the end of the
struggle; “The next morning I found that our loss had been so great and there
was so much disorganization in some of the commands that I did not consider it
proper to renew the attack that day.”
On the night of the 18th Lee re-crossed
the Potomac, and an attempt by the Federal advance to follow was so vigorously
met and with such terrible slaughter that, in the language of General A.P.
Hill, “few were left to tell [235] the tale;” they were driven in great
confusion into the Potomac, “and by their own account, 3,000 men were killed
and drowned.”
BURNSIDE SEEKS TO
CAPTURE RICHMOND, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1862
Lee’s army was recruited after his
arrival in the lower valley of Virginia to a total of all arms, immediately
under himself, of about 40,000. McClellan concentrated his army early in
November about Warrenton, where he was relieved of command by General [Ambrose]
Burnside, who planned at once another advance on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. Lee therefore ordered Longstreet
to that place and Jackson to Orange Court House. About the middle of the month
the Federal advance appeared opposite Fredericksburg and with some surprise saw
the Confederate guns already posted on the hills in their front. By the 12th of
December, Burnside had his army of 100,000 men, as he testified before the [United States Congress Joint]
Committee on the Conduct of the War,
aligned against Lee’s 73,000 on the south side of the river, and on the morning
of the 13th began the terrible battle. Attack after attack was most bravely
made by the Army of the Potomac, with great pertinacity, notwithstanding their
repeated repulses with fearful slaughter. Burnside’s defeat was overwhelming,
and the casualties were so great that the unfortunate Federal general, after
one later and futile advance, relinquished his hope of gaining Richmond and
willingly retired from command.
MURFREESBORO AND THE
VICKSBURG EXPEDITIONS, JANUARY TO MAY, 1863
On the 25th of December, Rosecrans
began to advance upon Bragg’s position at Murfreesboro with a fighting strength
of about 60,000 men. General Bragg with 35,000 held a line crossing Stone’s River. On the 30th, Rosecrans arrived
with part of his force before this line, and upon his failure to attack, Bragg assailed
him the [236] next day with very considerable success. Rosecrans then changed
his line and awaited reinforcements, and in the meantime several brief
conflicts occurred between portions of the two armies, one of them being a
vigorous charge by [John Cabell] Breckinridge’s division. After a week of this
desultory fighting Bragg withdrew to Tullahoma.
The Federal plan of campaign in the
West, in the winter of 1862-63, embraced an invasion of the State of
Mississippi, with the special object of taking Vicksburg.
At that point strong works upon the bluffs commanded the Mississippi, and had
successfully resisted the attacks of the Federal river fleets, in June and July
of that year. In December, General Grant led an army southward through the
State, to menace the rear of Vicksburg, while General Sherman attacked with a
force transported upon the river. Foiled by the cutting of his own
communications and the signal defeat of Sherman by General Stephen D. Lee at Chickasaw Bayou, General Grant embarked in
January, 1863, at Memphis, and moved his army to the Louisiana side of the
Mississippi River opposite Vicksburg. After various attempts were made to approach
the city from the north side, all of which failed, Grant’s army crossed below
Vicksburg, and after a brief campaign extending over the State as far as
Jackson, the siege of Vicksburg was begun May 18th.
MINOR CONFEDERATE
VICTORIES EARLY IN 1863
Several small Confederate
victories, such as the defense of Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River, Georgia,
against the monitor Montauk and several gunboats, on the 1st
and 28th of February and the 3d of March; the success of the Palmetto and Chicora, two Confederate ironclads, in
clearing Charleston Harbor of the blockading fleet, and the
surrender of the Isaac
Smith, a
Federal gunboat, to the batteries on Stono
River, are notable
among the early events of 1863. At Galveston [237] Harbor, Texas, on January
1st, the Union flagship Westfield was blown up, and the Harriet
Lane boarded
by the Texans and taken. On March 5th a Federal brigade was captured at Spring
Hill, Tennessee, by [General Earl] Van Dorn. Confederate armed cruisers were
playing havoc among the shipping interests in many waters. The Alabama had captured the United States
ship Hatteras, and this vessel and the Florida cruised in the West India waters
and off the coast of South America. The commander of the Florida estimated his captures at 70 vessels, and Captain [Paul J.] Semmes of the Alabama
reported the capture by his ship of 56 vessels. Since the commencement of the
war it was reported that 284 vessels with their cargoes, valued at $15,000,000,
had been destroyed on the high seas by this active branch of the Confederate
naval force.
BATTLE OF
CHANCELLORSVILLE
For three months after the battle
of Fredericksburg the Army of Northern Virginia rested in winter quarters, and
when the spring opened it was well prepared for the Federal attack which
General Hooker, the successor of Burnside, was expected to make with his army
of nearly 132,000 men. The official report of the Confederate army arrayed on
the south side of the Rappahannock against this large Federal force shows
present for duty on March 31,1863: [Richard H.] Anderson’s and [Lafayette] McLaws’ divisions of Longstreet’s corps, 25,649; Jackson’s
corps, 33,333; cavalry, 6,509; reserve artillery, 1,821; total of all arms,
57,212. Of this number less than 42,000 participated in the battle of
Chancellorsville.
The Army of the Potomac, with which
Hooker was attempting to destroy the army of Lee, was composed of seven army
corps of infantry—the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh and Twelfth,
containing 119,661 men, and a corps of cavalry, 22,000, making a total of [238]
131,661. Of this number about 90,000 were employed in the Battle of Chancellorsville. The physical force of the
Federals thus appears to have been about double that of the Confederate army.
The advance Federal movement began
by the crossing of [John] Sedgwick below Fredericksburg and the
passage by Hooker of the upper fords. Soon after moving his own force across
the river, Hooker withdrew a part of Sedgwick’s force and concentrated at
Chancellorsville an army of six corps, containing nearly 90,000 men under his
immediate command. The dispositions thus made by the Federal commander to force
a retreat by Lee at great disadvantage or a fight in which he could be crushed,
have been commended by military critics, but the great abilities of the
Confederate chieftain were equal to the vast responsibility now thrust upon
him. With him were the superb corps and division generals, Jackson, Anderson,
McLaws, Early, Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee,
whose commands confided in their skill and were ready to execute their plans.
It was quickly observed by Lee that
the main assault was not to be made by Sedgwick, and that a direct attack on
Hooker was perilous on account of his great numbers and strong position. A
flank movement by Jackson while Early held Sedgwick was therefore soon adopted
as the principal feature of the plan, notwithstanding the details of execution
divided the Confederate army into three parts. Jackson executed his part of the
plan on the afternoon of May 2d, with such wonderful daring and skill that his
onset crushed through Hooker’s right wing and spread a panic over nearly the
whole of the Federal army at Chancellorsville. Sedgwick, at Fredericksburg, had
meantime driven Early’s small force from his front and was directing his advance
toward Hooker. But on the next morning after Jackson’s bewildering flank
assault, his force, commanded by Stuart after the great hero of the first fight
had fallen, joined the divisions [239] which Lee had retained near the center
of his line, and these united commands attacked Hooker with an impetuosity
which made them masters of the works he had constructed. Sedgwick, with his
superior weight, had captured Marye’s Hill and threatened the rear of Lee’s
victorious army, but this dangerous movement was foiled by Lee, who led McLaws
and [Cadmus] Wilcox against Sedgwick in the afternoon,
driving him back upon his reserve at nightfall. Early advanced next day on the
Telegraph Road, and with a few assaults recovered Marye’s Heights and the
ridges, which placed him in the rear of the enemy’s left. Hooker, in the midst
of these disasters which imperiled his army, diligently fortified his position
near Chancellorsville, and Lee, being unwilling to attack him with only a part
of his force then at hand, was compelled to consume the greater portion of the
day in getting his divided army united and in position to advance. This
difficult undertaking was accomplished during the afternoon, and a short time before
sunset the attack was made. The Confederates swept again into the Federal
breastworks and compelled a hasty retreat during the darkness of night of the
whole of Hooker’s army across the river. At the same time Fredericksburg was
abandoned by Sedgwick. At sunrise of the next day the Confederates found
themselves in full possession of the field, enjoying a complete victory.
General Hooker, safe again on the bluffs, with the river rolling between him
and Lee, reviewed the events of the week and frivolously congratulated the Army
of the Potomac on their ability to fight or to retreat as circumstances
required. The death of Jackson was a loss most seriously felt by the army. No
estimate of his military abilities has yet appeared extravagant to the men who
fought with him, but no calculations as to results had his life been spared can
ever be indulged.
[240] FROM
CHANCELLORSVILLE TO GETTYSBURG, JUNE AND JULY, 1863
What policy should be pursued by
the Confederate government after two years of defensive warfare and three
campaigns in which all the power of the United States had been vainly exerted
to reach the Confederate capital or to break into the centers of the
Confederate territory? This was the question to be considered in view of the
management of the war which had been made up to that time upon the States. With
the single exception of the strongly organized and definite efforts to capture
Richmond, the entire scope of the conflict revealed only scattered expeditions
of various sizes by land and sea, producing no decided result, yet causing a
measureless amount of suffering. Over a million Federal soldiers were dispersed
over the borders, around the coasts, and along the rivers of the South, but
there was only one Army having one definite aim. Except the Army of the Potomac,
the other vast forces of the United States were operating in large and small
detachments. One lone aim—to take Richmond—enchained the attention of the
Administration at Washington.
Upon due reflection it was
determined by General Lee on the field, and President Davis at the capital, not
to attack Hooker on the heights of Fredericksburg, nor to wait on the
administration at Washington to plan a new line of advance against Richmond,
but to draw the Federal armies from Virginia by boldly marching the Army of
Northern Virginia northward. Accordingly Lee prepared his army at once for this
movement. It was reorganized into three corps: Longstreet’s, the First; Ewell’s,
the Second; A.P. Hill’s, the Third; and Stuart commanding the cavalry. With
this organization Lee crossed the Potomac in June, advanced into Pennsylvania,
and at Gettysburg on July 1st encountered a part of
the Army of the Potomac under [George G.] Meade, who had superseded Hooker.
The first day’s fighting ended in [241] the defeat of the
Federals, who were driven through the village of Gettysburg to the heights
beyond. General Lee from an elevated site saw the flight of the beaten
regiments over the hills, and ordered the taking of the heights if it could be
done. Unfortunately, the order was not obeyed; perhaps its value was not
understood. The Confederate commander designed to promptly renew the fight next morning, but the troops required for the
attack were not in position until 4 o’clock in the afternoon, and the assault
then made, although vigorously pressed, was not sufficiently in concert to
achieve the best results.
General Meade’s army had meanwhile
hurried up, and stretching along the commanding “heights of Gettysburg,”
fortified thoroughly their almost impregnable position. On the third day Lee’s
entire army reached the ground, and after some further irritating delays was
ready for the general movement to be made nearly according to the original
plan. At length heavy artillery firing along the lines of both armies preceded
the advance of the infantry [in an attack which history remembers as Pickett’s Charge]. The charge was designed to be general, and by
divisions in concert well supported, but the plan was not carried out.
Longstreet had said, “The Army of Northern Virginia is in condition to
undertake anything;” but “the army” as a whole did not fight that day together.
The charges were as gallant, as prolonged, and as desperate as men ever made in
battle, but they were delivered in detail. At many points the heights were
gained, but they could not be held. The Confederate columns heroically assailed
the entrenched positions of their enemy, and here and there carried them, but
being attacked on both flanks were driven back with heavy loss. The battle
ended after great slaughter on both sides, and the two armies stood still
before each other during the whole of the next day—the Fourth of July.
[242] AFTER
GETTYSBURG AND VICKSBURG.
During the day following Lee’s last
attack at Gettysburg his army remained in line twenty-four hours, within easy
reach of Meade without being assailed. It was afterward stated in testimony
before the [United States Congress Joint]
Committee on the Conduct of the War,
that in a council of Meade with his corps generals the propriety of the
withdrawal from Gettysburg of the Federal army was earnestly discussed. To what
extent any such withdrawal was considered at any time is not known, but it is
clear that Meade’s army had been seriously shattered and was not in a condition
which made an immediate advance advisable. The Gettysburg battle was indeed
very nearly a Confederate victory. Prompt pursuit of the flying foe on the
first day would have made triumph easy. Resolute attack on the morning of the
second day by all divisions must have given the field to the Confederates. The
fortunes of battle were uncertain on the third day, after all the Federal
forces were on entrenched elevations which they were to hold by superior
numbers of infantry and artillery. It was still possible by concerted heroic
movement to have captured the entrenchments; and this possibility is suggested
by the fact that wherever the Confederate attack was heroic and concerted the
Federal lines were broken, but where concerted action and due support were
lacking the movement failed. So nearly was Meade beaten that he was forced to
let the recoiled line of Lee lie undisturbed while its great commander arranged
the withdrawal of his army into Virginia. The issue at Gettysburg between a
Confederate army of 62,000 and a Federal army (fighting on its own soil) of l05,000,
reached this stage of doubt after three days of battle, with loss of
Confederates 19,000 and of Federals 20,000.
On the day when Lee and Meade were
thus contemplating their respective situations, the central strategic position
in the West—Vicksburg and the Mississippi [243] River—was
surrendered to the Federal forces after a prolonged siege. With valor similar
to that which had been shown by the Army of Northern Virginia in the battles of
this year, their comrades in the West had been contending for supremacy in that
section. After many battles the defenders of Vicksburg endured a siege of
nearly fifty days and their surrender became imperative. Four days afterward Port Hudson was also given up and the
Mississippi River went out of Confederate control.
These two prominent events
occurring together—the withdrawal of Lee from Gettysburg to Virginia and the
loss of the Mississippi River—are indissolubly associated in the public mind as
the turning point of the issue at arms between the two nations. What might have
been the achievements of Lee’s army if Stonewall Jackson had not fallen at
Chancellorsville is a deeply interesting speculation. What would have resulted
had Meade’s army been broken into fragments, leaving Maryland delivered, and
Washington open to capture, will also remain among unsolved questions. Rumor
said that foreign nations were prepared to recognize the Confederate States if
Lee made his advance successful; that domestic discontent throughout the North
would increase to a revolt there, and that the peace party would present a
front which the war party could not withstand. This sketch, however, treats of
events only, and throwing them into groups as they occur will leave them to
speak for themselves.
Taking fresh account of the
military situation after this Fourth of July epoch in the Confederate war, it
will be found that Meade after some delay transferred his army into Virginia
and advanced to Culpeper, where Lee confronted him with a
line along the Rapidan [River]. Lee’s army when placed in this position was
about 48,000, recruited to 56,000 by the 1st of August, including all arms, and
composed of the corps of Longstreet, Ewell [244] and [A.P.] Hill, the artillery
and Stuart’s cavalry. Longstreet’s corps was sent to Bragg, and Lee’s army from
that time varied very slightly from 43,000 after the end of 1863. Two corps
were ordered away from Meade about the same time that Longstreet’s two
divisions were detached from Lee and sent to Johnston. The two armies thus
reduced were engaged only in desultory fighting, including one successful
advance by Lee in October, and the attempt of Meade at Mine Run
which failed.
CHICKAMAUGA AND
MISSIONARY RIDGE, SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER, 1863
Bragg, commanding in Tennessee, had
fallen back in June, during Lee’s operations in Pennsylvania, from Tullahoma to
Chattanooga, with his army of 44,000 men, and placed it in entrenchments there
in the period of Gettysburg and the surrender of Vicksburg. Rosecrans, with an
army of about 65,000, followed him across the Tennessee River, and Burnside
with 15,000 took possession of Cumberland Gap. Bragg, perceiving the design of
Rosecrans to turn his left flank, evacuated Chattanooga and chose a line of
battle on the Chickamauga River. These movements occupied the time from July
1st to September 18th, and brought the two armies together at the Battle of Chickamauga. The first day’s fight on the 19th
was a drawn battle, but General Longstreet’s divisions arrived on the field,
and with this accession of strength Bragg won on the 20th the great battle that
utterly defeated the whole of the army of Rosecrans except the wing which [George Henry] Thomas held with a steadiness that gained
him the well-won title of “the Rock of Chickamauga.”
The routed forces of Rosecrans,
that fled into Chattanooga from this battlefield, were joined by Thomas, who
had made good his retreat after his heroic fighting. The Confederate army
closed in about the place of refuge which Rosecrans had sought, and made
critical the situation [245] of his army. The Confederate forces had now
acquired an advantage which it appears was lost by the detaching of Longstreet
on an expedition to drive Burnside from Knoxville; and perhaps also by the
neglect of an opportunity for making a united bold advance into Tennessee. At
the time that Bragg’s forces were thus weakened by the absence of Longstreet
and were held as besiegers of Chattanooga in the lines along Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, Federal reinforcements drawn from
Virginia and Tennessee in large numbers were hurried to the relief of
Rosecrans. General Grant was also ordered to take command and Rosecrans was
relieved.
About the middle of November the
Federal army had been increased to 80,000 men, nearly doubling the force of
Bragg, and inspired with confidence by the arrival of a new commander.
Confiding in this force and appreciating the value of a quick blow while
Longstreet was away, General Grant moved against Bragg, and on November 25th
drove him from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge to a new position near
Dalton, in Georgia. This much accomplished, a large reinforcement was sent
rapidly to Burnside, at Knoxville, causing Longstreet to withdraw toward
Virginia.
FEDERAL PREPARATIONS
TO INVADE GEORGIA, 1864
The greater part of the armies in
Virginia and Tennessee rested awhile in the midst of the severe winter.
Sherman, however, with an army of 30,000 marched against Meridian, Mississippi, which he entered on
February 16th and began his usual work of destruction with both infantry and
cavalry. But he was harassed by Forrest, who had “the genius for cavalry
fighting,” and after his own cavalry force of 8,000 men had been punished so
severely in a number of fights that they rode off to Memphis, Sherman retreated
to Vicksburg.
During the same month the invasion
of Florida by [246] [Truman] Seymour was arrested by the Confederate victory at Olustee,
February 20th, fought under Generals [Alfred] Colquitt and [Joseph] Finegan. Texas and Louisiana, at this season, became the
ground of an expedition of combined land and naval forces under General [Nathaniel Prentice] Banks and Admiral [David Dixon] Porter, who went up Red River
early in March and advanced upon Shreveport. The expedition had large
proportions and expectations of acquiring an immense quantity of cotton, but it
met with most mortifying defeats by the Confederates under General [Richard] Taylor. Banks found the way to New
Orleans for himself and parts of his disordered command, while Porter escaped
with his gunboats by the ingenuity of an engineer. General Banks was relieved
of his command.
THE GREAT FINAL
MOVEMENTS
The trial year of war had arrived,
the last of those four years from April, 1861, to April, 1865, in which the
Confederacy was defended by armies which had fought with unexcelled courage,
and by a navy of gunboats and cruisers created with a rapidity and managed with
a skill that provoked astonishment and admiration.
While little mention in this scant
outline has been made of the action of the Confederate administration at
Richmond during the progress of hostilities, it will be borne in mind that all
departments had been thoroughly absorbed with the business of war. The
President, as commander-in-chief, had often been personally in council on the
field with military chieftains, and two or three times exposed in battle. The
secretaries of war and the navy, the adjutant-general with his assistants, the
bureaus and all chiefs of departments had little relaxation from labor.
Congress in frequent and prolonged sessions prepared and passed all acts which
the increasing pressure of the war demanded. Governors of States, with the
officials under them, bent all their energies to the duty of meeting the
demands upon them, and the people of [247] the South were industriously working
to supply the armies. The numerous Confederate dead were mourned for in
thousands of homes; an army of men, disabled by wounds or disease, was
scattered in all sections of the Confederacy; the widows and orphans of the
fallen Southern braves were receiving the attention of legislatures in their
time of need, and although the numbers of the soldiery were greatly diminished
and the general resources for war had shrunken everywhere, yet the budding
springtime of 1864 brought a renewal of purpose to achieve independence and a
revival of the hope that it could be gained.
EVENTS, GREAT AND
SMALL, WORK TOGETHER IN 1864
The chief interest in the campaign
of 1864 centers in the army operations in Virginia and Georgia, but before the
collision came in early May between Lee and Grant in the former State, and
between Joseph E. Johnston and Sherman in the latter, there had been over 200
engagements since the 1st of January, covering portions of New Mexico, Texas,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia, many of these
fights rising to the dignity of battles. The activity of the combatants and the
great area of military operations are made apparent by this survey (at a
glance) of the theater of war. The defense of the South at so many points where
its territory was attacked, required local uses of its resources and
detachments from the main armies of large numbers of its troops, or the arming
of nearly the entire male population. In line with the policy of destruction
then adopted at Washington and understood at the headquarters of the armies,
many expeditions and raids invaded the Southern interior, subsisting on the
country while they could and leaving desolation when they withdrew. Fighting
for farm and fireside was made necessary. Agriculture was hindered,
transportation [248] crippled, and all resources for successful war diminished.
The Southern States still under the protection of the Confederate armies were
thus left in such alarm, notwithstanding the raiders were usually driven off,
that productions available for the armies were greatly reduced.
Among this large number of small
affairs, the movements of Grant in Virginia to be met by Lee, and of Sherman in
Georgia to be met by Johnston, indicated the coming of great events. Grant’s
lone task was to take Richmond, distant only a few days’ march. The capital of
the Confederacy was the castle whose capture would satisfy the monarchs of Europe
that President Davis had lost his government. Belligerent rights, which had
been rightfully accorded the Confederate government when organized in due form
and defended by successful arms, had chafed the Washington administration. The
fall of Richmond would be followed by the withdrawal of these belligerent
rights, so that the Confederate movement for independence would probably at
once subside. To the attainment of this great end Grant was equipped with a
splendid army for his personal command, and made lieutenant-general in control
of the United States army operations. Sherman’s advance southward was not so
distinctly determined. Marching from Dalton upon Johnston he could move into
Alabama and find his “deep water” at Mobile; or, cutting a way into Georgia he
could gain Atlanta, from which he might proceed to Savannah. He could make a
strong demonstration on either course and retire into Tennessee and be
available in helping Grant. Sherman’s task was to further subdivide Confederate
territory, destroy its resources, interrupt communications and prevent
reinforcements from going to Lee. His operations were subordinate and would
avail nothing unless Grant destroyed Lee’s army and captured Richmond.
Meanwhile the United States armies
were well supported [249] by the dispositions of the Navy. The total number of
naval vessels in use was 588, of 4,443 guns aggregate, consisting of 46
ironclad steamers for coast service, 150 guns; 29 ironclad steamers for inland
service, 152 guns; 203 sidewheel steamers, 1,240 guns; 198 screw steamers,
1,578 guns; 112 sailing vessels, 1,328 guns. The number of seamen in service
was over 40,000. Six squadrons were kept along the Atlantic Seaboard and the
Gulf shores. One flotilla patrolled the Mississippi River, and another occupied
the Potomac and the James. Other squadrons were stationed on the Pacific Coast,
and a considerable number of vessels was employed in search of the bold
cruisers and privateers who were destroying United States commerce. The
squadrons on the Atlantic and the Gulf stood guard over Southern ports to
enforce the blockade, in which duties they were often interrupted by bold
attacks.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1864
BEGINS IN MAY
At the beginning of the campaign of
1864 the forces with which General Lee was preparing to meet Grant were, in
round numbers, infantry 50,000, cavalry 8,700, artillery 4,850—the total of all
arms present for duty not exceeding 64,000. These numbers had been reached
since the official return of April l0th, by the arrival of the divisions of
Longstreet. The army then numbering 64,000 of all arms was composed of the
First Corps, Longstreet; Second Corps, A. P. Hill; Third Corps, Ewell; Cavalry
Corps, J.E.B. Stuart, containing the divisions of [Wade] Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee; and the Maryland Line, [consisting of volunteers from
the border state of Maryland], General Bradley T. Johnson. This force was called the Army of
Northern Virginia.
The Army of the Potomac under General
Grant, as reported by the Secretary of War, had on May 1st present for duty
120,380 of all arms, which number was increased by the arrival of the Ninth Corps,
27,780 strong, to the great force of 141,160 men of all arms—a few more than
[250] double the army of Lee. This general statement that at the outset of the
campaign the military strength of Grant’s army doubled that of the army under
Lee, has been given by many investigators who made their calculations from all
authoritative sources. Taking into the computation all of the men whom Grant
could readily make available for an immediate advance without endangering
Washington or weakening other important positions, in comparison with the force
which Lee could employ to resist his advance in May, 1864, it is ascertained
that the disparity in numbers was two to one. But the difference in equipment
was much greater. The army of Grant moved with resources of the ordnance,
quartermaster, commissary and medical departments very greatly exceeding those
of the army of Lee. It must be taken into the general consideration of General
Grant’s campaign that he employed the force of other columns collaterally with
his own. Butler, with 30,000 men, entered the James when Grant moved across the
Rapidan, and landed at Bermuda Hundred and City Point, which he fortified after
one timid attempt to capture Petersburg. His operations afterward availed Grant
nothing except the employment of Confederate forces under Beauregard to defeat
his expeditions and finally to “bottle him up.” General Sigel invaded the [Shenandoah] Valley with about 10,000 men, where he
was defeated by Breckinridge on May 15th at New Market. Hunter, relieving Sigel, achieved
such considerable success as to require the detaching of Early, in June, to
drive him from the Valley. Generals [George] Crook and [William Woods] Averell advanced through southwestern
Virginia, but were compelled to retire before General Sam Jones to the Valley. [Philip] Sheridan’s splendid cavalry were constantly employed to the
embarrassment of the Confederates from the beginning to the close of the
general movement. These troops will be considered in the progress of the
campaign as they increase Grant’s army and consequently enlarge the disparity
between his force and Lee’s.
[251]
Almost simultaneously the armies of Sherman and Grant moved out on their
respective lines of advance—Sherman to penetrate Georgia and Grant to take Richmond.
General Grant, on May 4th, crossed the Rapidan to place his army between Lee
and Richmond, but on the 5th and 6th found himself in sudden battle in the Wilderness. Checked in the first move, Grant
turned toward Spotsylvania Court House, designing to reach that vantage ground
before Lee discovered his purpose. But the Confederate commander anticipated
the movement by marching Longstreet’s corps to the same point, where the two
armies again faced each other and fought for position on the 9th and 10th.
General Sheridan, in co-operation with this infantry movement to Spotsylvania, had been sent by Grant with a
fine corps of about 10,000 cavalry to ride to the rear of Lee’s army and cut
the communications with Richmond. Stuart, following after him, fought the Battle of Yellow Tavern and rescued Richmond, but lost his
own life. Sheridan’s raid did not succeed and he returned to Grant.
The fighting at Spotsylvania,
nearly continuous, culminated on this line on the 12th, when a salient left
without proper artillery protection was carried at dawn by a Federal assault
which swept over General Edward Johnson’s division and greatly imperiled Lee’s
army. A most remarkable infantry struggle took place during the day of this
assault, at the end of which the Federal advance was checked. For a week
afterward Grant awaited the arrival of reinforcements from Washington, which
were sent, and then moving behind the cover of the rivers toward Bowling Green,
found Lee in line offering battle at Hanover Junction. Shifting his army
eastward without having ventured to attack Lee in this new position, he
maneuvered to deceive Lee, but the two great armies again met on the
battlefield of Cold Harbor, where the Federals were placed at
disadvantage. It was at this point that General Grant, on the 3d of June, made
[252] those unavailing assaults on the lines of the Army of Northern Virginia
which were so destructive to his divisions that at last they silently declined
to advance. “The immobile lines pronounced a verdict,” writes [William] Swinton
in his [Campaigns
of the] Army of the Potomac,
“silent, yet emphatic, against further slaughter. The loss on the Union side in
this sanguinary action was over 13,000, while on the part of the Confederates
it is doubtful whether it reached as many hundreds.”
After this victory Lee detached
Early to check Hunter’s ravages in the Valley, and from the same bloody field
the persistent Federal general moved his army to the south side of James River
and sought retrieval by a movement to take Petersburg by surprise, in which he
was foiled by Beauregard’s small command. As the general result of the entire
campaign, the Army of the Potomac was concentrated south of the Appomattox River
to begin the Siege of Petersburg, and the opinion was held and
expressed with some vehemence at the North that Grant had slaughtered an army
without gaining one decisive victory.
CHARLESTON AND FORT
SUMTER IN 1864
Charleston had also received the
attention of the Federal government while plans were made against Richmond and
Atlanta. It was already distinguished by the failure of repeated attempts to
take it, and deserves some connected mention at this juncture of Confederate
affairs. Doubtless the early capture of that city would have very greatly
gratified all those in the United States who regarded it as the originator of
secession. The capture of Fort Sumter in April, 1861, by the Confederates, was
apparently easily accomplished, but the defense of the same spot by them was so
heroic and skillful that it was never taken by force from its captors. The
battles of Secessionville in June, and of Pocotaligo in October, 1862, were won in
South Carolina’s defense. The blockade [253] of the port was made strong by the
presence of a formidable fleet, but blockaders still came in and the fleet was
often disturbed. In January, 1863, the Confederate ironclads Palmetto State and Chicora, in the harbor, boldly attacked
the whole Federal wooden fleet, capturing the Mercedita and the Keystone
State. The
other Federal vessels steamed out to sea, leaving the harbor open for a day and
night. Masked batteries opened on the Federal gunboat in the Stono River and
cutting off retreat, compelled surrender. A squadron of eight ironclads was
finally sent to subdue Sumter and capture Charleston. These
powerful vessels, armed with guns of heavy caliber, steamed into position April
7, 1863, and opening fire on Sumter received such response from the fort and
the batteries as to cause the withdrawal of the fleet, with many of the ships
injured and one of them destroyed. A few months later a Federal landing was
made on Morris Island, and Battery Wagner was furiously
bombarded, July 11th, by the fleet and batteries, followed by General [Truman] Seymour’s assault which General [William B.] Taliaferro repulsed, causing Seymour a loss
of over 1,500 men. Near the same date Sumter endured a seven days’ bombardment,
which tore down its walls in a mass of ruins, but Beauregard, again commanding
at Charleston, erected interior defenses and still held the ruined fort. It
became necessary for the Confederates to withdraw from Fort Gregg, Battery
Wagner and Morris Island, and yet they held the mass of Sumter’s ruins and
defended Charleston. Both the fort and the city were in the possession of the
Confederates when Grant marched in May, 1864, to overthrow Lee, and Sherman
moved against Johnston. After the first terrible bombardment which reduced the
fort to ruins, the Confederate engineers and soldiers converted the debris into
an earthwork of such strength that it bore bombardment through all the
campaigns of Grant and Sherman. It stood as the invincible protector of South
Carolina’s harbor through a year [254] and a half of Federal attack, endured “for
a hundred days and nights their utmost power,” and resisting all efforts to
take away its crown by force, the old work saw with defiance the army of
Sherman pass by in 1865 toward Columbia. The brave fort and gallant city were
first in the war and last in the surrender.
SHERMAN IN GEORGIA,
1864
During the time in which Grant was
contending with Lee for the possession of Richmond, Sherman and Johnston were
engaged in the campaign through Georgia. Sherman reached Atlanta
soon after Grant had settled his army in the trenches at Petersburg and around
Richmond, so that these cities were placed under siege about the same time, but
this advantage had not been easily gained. His army, of sufficient strength to
cover Johnston’s front with one-half its own, thus leaving another army free to
operate on the flank, encountered skillful and vigorous opposition on many
battlefields. Adopting tactics for which his superior force was well adapted,
Sherman forced Johnston back by flank movements, but not without severe
engagements at Resaca, May 14th; New Hope Church and Dallas,
May 25th-27th; Kennesaw Mountain, June 27th; besides many small
engagements in which the Federal army suffered great losses. Gathering his “three
armies” around Atlanta in July, Sherman began to consider his next movements,
and it has been said that the removal of Johnston at this stage of the campaign
gave him great satisfaction. Johnston, who had fought him with skill from
Dalton to the Chattahoochee River, but had contended with him by retreats, was
succeeded by [John Bell] Hood, whose fame for impetuous
leadership caused Sherman to consider that the Confederate plans would be
changed.
Pausing to take observation from
the position now reached, by the Confederate trend, it does not at once clearly
appear that the situation had very much changed. [255] Fighting had been
occurring in every Southern State since the middle of May, until the reported
number of engagements was 180, besides those fought between the great armies of
the two nations, and this is far below the actual number of skirmishes between
small bodies in every State. The successes of Grant and Sherman had consisted
in merely a gain of ground at a great loss of men. Grant was scarcely better
stationed at the end of his campaign, and with the loss of thousands of men,
than McClellan was when Lee caused his retreat from Richmond. The chief gain was
in the reduction of Confederate numbers, which could not be replaced. Sherman
had reached the piedmont of Georgia, where the table-lands stretched before him
with rivers running to the sea, but his situation was perilous. Mobile,
Savannah and Charleston were still Confederate strongholds, forbidding advance
from the South into the Confederate interior. The Trans-Mississippi States,
although cut off from the Confederacy in the East, were yet unsubdued and
capable of taking care of themselves. The little navy yet left was doing good
service, and the privateers were doing full damage wherever they were afloat.
The general survey thus made, produced some muttering in the North and inspired
some hopes in the South, but the insight of the situation showed a region
beginning to suffer heavily from an exhaustion which could not be stayed. The
producing area of the Confederacy had been lessened, producers had become much
fewer, products had been destroyed, communication by rivers and railroads had
been cut off, transportation had been alarmingly reduced, and there was no
reliable money. The army official reports showed a considerable strength still
left in the numbers of fighting men; but they were necessarily scattered over a
vast territory, defending hundreds of important minor positions with inadequate
munitions, while the combined armies of Lee and Johnston had not half the
strength of either army under Grant or Sherman. [256] In these balances the
Confederacy was weighed in July, 1864. There was yet a possibility of acquiring
independence, and because of that possibility the administration at Richmond,
the armies in the field, and the people in their homes resolved in the summer
of 1864 on the continuance of the contest.
Hood, succeeding Johnston, struck
one of Sherman’s corps north of Atlanta on the 10th, and the entire army on the
22d, and still again on the 28th of July. Afterward Sherman’s movements
necessitated the Battles of Jonesboro and Lovejoy’s Station, in which the Federals gained
advantages that caused the evacuation of Atlanta and opened it for occupation
by the Federal army. General Hood, advising with the Richmond administration,
planned a bold movement northward to destroy Sherman’s communications and to
draw him out of Georgia into the former battle grounds of Tennessee. The
movement temporarily drew a considerable part of the Federal army into
northwest Georgia, and was attended with several small Confederate victories;
but in September, Sherman, returning to Atlanta, wantonly burned the city as
thoroughly as he could, and leaving it smoking behind him, marched southward,
with little opposition, using the destructive agencies of fire and pillage
along his broad route to Savannah.
THE RESULT APPROACHES
ASCERTAINMENT
While Sherman and Hood were
contesting the ground in Georgia in July and September, E. Kirby Smith and General
[Richard] Taylor were holding the enemy in check in the Trans-Mississippi Department;
Lieutenant-General S.D. Lee, commanding the Department of
Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana, had there vigorously engaged the
Federal forces until he was transferred to command with Hood at Atlanta, while
a great number of skirmishes and small engagements took place in Tennessee and
Kentucky. General Forrest, under orders from General S. D. [257] Lee, had
gained a great victory June 10th in the Battle of Tishomingo Creek, in Mississippi, thoroughly
beating [Benjamin Henry] Grierson and [Samuel Davis] Sturgis, capturing 1,600 officers and men,
6 guns, 1,500 small-arms, besides a vast amount of ordnance and quartermaster
stores. This brilliant battle was followed by other remarkable exploits of this
great cavalry general at Pontotoc and Harrisburg, Mississippi; at Memphis, Tennessee,
and in various other expeditions. During the same period of activity, the
Federal Admiral Farragut, with four ironclad monitors and fourteen other
vessels, attacked the small Confederate fleet commanded by Admiral [Franklin] Buchanan in Mobile Bay, and passing Fort Morgan, disabled
several Confederate vessels and drove the remainder up the river. Having gained
this advantage he soon captured the forts, with their guns and men, but was
unable to wrest Mobile from the defenders in the entrenchments.
The Confederate activity in the
States west of Georgia ceased somewhat on account of the great need of Hood for
reinforcements during his advance northward into Tennessee, in which his army,
although fighting with wonderful courage at Franklin, and afterward at Nashville, became so shattered that its
retirement southward again became imperative. The remnants of this splendid
army, which had fought so long under Albert Sidney Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg,
Joseph E. Johnston and Hood, on returning through Georgia appeared once more in
front of Sherman in South Carolina.
Meantime the Confederate line of
Lee extended thirty-five miles along the breastworks which engineers, the most
skillful of any army, had constructed for the protection of the Confederate
capital. Fortressed by these defenses, which were manned their whole length by
men far too few to occupy them, the cities of Petersburg and Richmond withstood all the
assaults of the great Federal army, through the summer and winter months until
the spring of 1865 had come, the details of which [258] protracted siege are
given in many volumes of [the Confederate
Military History] and may not be recounted here. It dragged its wearisome
course through the summer while Early was pushing Hunter into the mountains of
western Virginia, driving Sigel across the Potomac, defeating Wallace at Monocacy,
forming line of battle in sight of Washington City, to the amazement of its
defenders, mingled with no little amount of the old fear for the safety of the capital.
After thus scandalizing the military management of the Federals, Early defeated
Crook and Averell at Kernstown, and gained such mastery of the Valley
as to require the special expedition of a new force of 40,000 infantry,
attended by a chosen body of cavalry, to finally defeat him after many
engagements extending into the winter.
The operations of Grant against
Petersburg and Richmond from July to the opening of the following spring, were
comprised in approaches by entrenchments; the explosion of a mine under the Confederate
breastworks on the 30th of July [in the Battle of the Crater]; attempted extensions of his
lines in August, in which he was partially successful at Globe Tavern and defeated at Reams’ Station; besides other efforts on both
sides of the River James, which did not change the situation to his advantage.
The total result of events to
February, 1865, was such that the Confederate government ventured, through a commission composed of [Alexander] Stephens, [Robert] Hunter and [John] Campbell, to present again to the Federal
administration proposals for peace. The Confederate government was justified at
this time in seeking for a basis of peace between the sections, but what the
precise conditions were on which it would have accepted peace without
independence, has not yet clearly appeared. The exact point of appeasement was
never reached, but it is certain that President Lincoln, in his interview with
the commission, did not write the word “Union” and consent to the addition
thereto of whatever the commissioners desired. Mr. Lincoln was too wise to do
so foolish an [259] act, and the rumor that he did is not only without
evidence, but is against the testimony of the parties to the conference. Nor
does it appear conclusively that the ultimatum of President Davis was
independence or war. Whatever his exigency required him to declare to the
public as the true basis of a treaty, it must be considered that his utterances
had often committed him to restoration of the Union under the Constitution. But
these questions are put aside as not being within the scope of this outline of
army operations, that the situation of the great military contestants may be
now observed for the last time.
Sherman left Savannah, which he had
occupied after suffering the Confederate forces there to retreat without
hindrance into South Carolina. His march was resumed in January through that
State northward to Columbia, which he caused to be burned.
Charleston, flanked by this movement, was evacuated, and from this point the
Confederate forces under Johnston met the Federal advances toward North
Carolina.
On the return of the Army of Tennessee from its unfortunate expedition, General Joseph E.
Johnston had been recalled to command and placed in charge of all forces in
South and North Carolina, in order that a concentration might be effected with
which Sherman could be checked. The divisions of [Carter Littlepage] Stevenson and [Benjamin Franklin] Cheatham, brought from the Army of
Tennessee; the division of [Robert]
Hoke, which had
been detached for some time from the Army of Northern Virginia, and the troops
of [William Joseph] Hardee, withdrawn from Charleston, constituted the
infantry. Wheeler and [Wade] Hampton commanded the cavalry. The strength of the
forces when concentrated was probably 20,000 effective men of all arms. With
this command, brought together after Bragg had fought the Battle of Kinston, and Hardee the Battle of Averasboro, General Johnston confronted
Sherman’s force of 70,000 at Bentonville in engagements from the 19th to the 21st
of March, after which he moved his army to Raleigh.
[260] The march of Sherman from
Savannah northward bore directly upon the military situation around Richmond,
and his success in placing his strong force far up into North Carolina in such
dangerous proximity to Virginia brought the war to its real crisis. It is
scarcely necessary to again mention the Confederate and Federal forces
scattered throughout the South engaged in contests which bore slightly at this
time on the impending crisis in Confederate affairs. We may, therefore, turn to
Lee and Grant, so closely confronted at Petersburg that the exchange of
friendly chat between the lines was often substituted for the sharp explosion
of deadly arms.
Lee, having been appointed
general-in-chief of all Confederate armies on the 5th of February, began to
make various dispositions looking to the probability which he had contemplated
before, that Richmond must be abandoned. Early in February, he placed Johnston,
as already stated, in command of the Army of Tennessee, or such fragments of it
as remained after the campaign of 1864, and reinforced him with all troops he
could send into the Carolinas from any quarter. Communications southward were
kept protected, and supplies as much as possible were placed where they would
be available in case Richmond was lost. It was considered that a junction of
the army in Virginia with Johnston’s command in Carolina, might result in the
quick destruction of Sherman’s force, followed by a subsequent return to
recover Virginia from Grant. The great Confederate military chieftain seems to
have foreseen the inevitable evacuation of Richmond, and although providing
with utmost care against the calamity, made the best forecast in his power for
the operations of his army after that event.
During the first months of 1865,
General Grant continued to increase the efficiencies of his army for the final
trial of battle with the Army of Northern Virginia. Now and then he made
efforts to extend to the left, bringing on several conflicts, and occasionally
employed his guns [261] in practice upon the Confederate batteries. The service
in the trenches and rifle-pits was dreary indeed to both armies, but especially
so to the Confederates, whose rations were scant and clothing well worn. In the
extremity of the siege, one bold but unsuccessful attack was made March 25th,
by a part of Lee’s force, led by [John Brown] Gordon, in which Fort Stedman and a mile of breastworks were
gallantly taken from the Federals, only to be lost again. One week later, on
the 1st of April, Grant moved against Lee’s right, and destroying the divisions
of Pickett and Bushrod Johnson by a powerful flank attack during
the day, pursued his plans of assault next day with a general movement, which
broke the thin Confederate line at many positions and compelled the evacuation
of Petersburg and Richmond.
This Confederate disaster,
occurring after four years of successful resistance, will be explained by
examination into the relative condition of the two armies. The last return of
the strength of Lee’s army in Virginia, made February 20, 1865, accounted for
three corps of infantry, Johnson’s division, General Early’s Valley command,
the cavalry divisions of W.H.F. Lee, the troops of General J.A. Walker,
at the defenses of the Richmond & Danville Railroad; some unattached commands, and all
artillery. The aggregate present of this whole force at all places is given at
73,349; the present and absent, 160,411. The inspection reports summed up, on
the 28th of February, the aggregate present for duty 45,633, to which adding
one brigade of 2,000 on picket, and the effective artillery 5,000, it is
ascertained that Lee’s whole effective force at this date was about 53,000. It
will also be taken into the account that serious Confederate losses occurred
from this time to the beginning of Grant’s final assault, April 1st, and that a
considerable part of the force mentioned in the report was detached and not
directly available by Lee at the time of that assault. The estimate of Lee’s
army at 45,000 of all arms when the battle on Lee’s [262] right flank at Five Forks began on April 1st, is not far
from a true statement. In this battle at Five Forks the divisions of Pickett
and Bushrod Johnson were overwhelmed by [Gouvernour Kemble] Warren, [Andrew Atkinson] Humphreys and Sheridan, at a loss to the
Confederate army in killed, wounded and prisoners of 7,000 men; and in the
fighting of April 2d, which resulted in the fall of Petersburg and Richmond,
other losses, not less than 5,000 or 6,000, had been sustained. On deducting
from 45,000 these casualties of all kinds which occurred on the 1st and 2d of
April, it becomes clear that the general estimate, made by many calculations,
that Lee began his retreat with not more than 32,000 men of all arms, is a
close approximation to the actual number.
On the 1st of March, General Grant’s
armies, under Meade, [Edward] Ord and Sheridan, all of which were
available in the attack on Lee, contained an effective total of over 162,000,
according to the official reports. It has been stated that Grant moved upon Lee
April 1st with an actual force of 120,000. His cavalry, commanded by Sheridan,
was the best that had been put in the field on the Federal side, and doubled
the force under Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee.
His infantry, freshly uniformed and equipped, made a superb appearance in their
compact and well-supported advance against the gallant foe which had so long
and well defended the land they loved. It was not physically possible for the
reduced Army of Northern Virginia to resist on April 2d the Federal heavy
columns which assailed them along the entire front from the Appomattox River to
the exposed flank which had been turned on the day before. The ratio of
physical force on that day was fully four to one.
Lee withdrew from all the defenses
of the Confederate capital, and sought the way for junction with Johnston, but
while delayed at Amelia Court House by the necessity of securing
rations for his small army, was overtaken and turned from his chosen course.
The fighting in retreat [263] resulted in the reduction of his army by the 9th
of April to about 10,000 men, with which small force he essayed to cut through
toward Lynchburg, and that last recourse becoming futile, this remnant of a
great army was surrendered by the noble chieftain whom all nations admire and
revere. The terms of the surrender were highly honorable to General Grant, the
victorious Federal general, and greatly promoted the rapid cessation of the
long, bloody, costly struggle. The armies parted in mutual respect, and
notwithstanding there were other forces in the field, the conviction was
settled in the public mind that the Confederate movement had been effectually
checked. Over twenty small engagements occurred after the Battle of Appomattox in various parts of the
Confederacy, but none was important. General Johnston surrendered his forces,
April 26th, to General Sherman in North Carolina, and General Kirby Smith surrendered
the Trans-Mississippi Department on the 26th of May. President Lincoln was
murdered by an assassin on the 14th of April—an untimely death, deplored, not
only South and North, but throughout the civilized world. President Davis, well
worthy of the high honors which are paid to his memory, in attempting to reach
the West beyond the Mississippi, was captured and imprisoned, but afterward
released. Trial on the indictment against him could not result in conviction.
The presidency of the United States passed, under the provisions of the
Constitution, to Andrew Johnson. The Confederate States government
ceased to exist. Serious errors were committed by Washington politicians, in
reconstruction policies that fostered feeling which could have been easily
allayed by wiser action, and notwithstanding Southern protestations and proof
of fidelity to the faithful recognition of the real results of the war, it
required the struggle with Spain, after the passing of a generation, to bring
to the States of the Confederacy a just recognition of their true attitude
toward the Union.
[264] SOME GENERAL
RESULTS
In the general statistics of this
war of four years’ duration, it has been computed that there were 2,500
engagements reported by names, besides many not mentioned; the United States
put 2,773,304 enlisted men in their armies, and the Confederate States 800,000.
Upon the supposition that these numbers represented many re-enlistments, it
will be considered that deductions must be made from both amounts alike, which
will still leave the disparity of about four Federal soldiers to one
Confederate actually employed in the war. One million soldiers and seamen of the
two armies and navies suffered deaths or permanent disability during actual
service, and a large additional number died soon after the war ended, from
wounds and diseases contracted in service. Many thousands of survivors remained
sufferers from the effects of this hard warfare. The loss of commerce and of
labor is estimated in only a slight degree by the immense expenses of war,
which were met by taxation and government loans. Over 3,000,000 men employed in
the business of destructive war were taken from productive pursuits of peace.
To the expenses of the two general governments in maintaining war, add the
expenditures of all the States and many municipalities. Include in the account
the actual destruction of valuable property, of which no reliable data can be
obtained. Taking all data into calculation, the sum total of the cost has been
reasonably computed at $10,000,000,000. On the credit side of this statement,
it appears that not a foot of territory was added; not one of the great number
of material advantages which nations ought to gain resulted from the struggle
between the sections. Yet there were some inestimable results like these: State
secession ceased to be a remedy for redress of popular grievances; the
statehood of the State, put in peril first by coercion and next by
reconstruction, stood its trial by both adversaries, and at last triumphed at a
judgment bar which recognizes [265] the legal force and political worth of the
Constitution of the United States; the Union of all States under the great
instrument which formed it has been demonstrated to be better than a division
of sections, and the Constitution to be worth fighting for against those who
would subvert it. American military and naval skill was proved to the world’s
nations. The Confederacy proudly presented to fame Albert Sidney Johnston,
Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, P.G.T. Beauregard among its generals in
chief command, and Wheeler, Forrest, Stuart, Hampton as cavalry chieftains;
while Stonewall Jackson led all in those rare, unique capacities of his own
whose work was arrested by death. In its navy, Buchanan and Semmes made fame
without resources, and the necessity which stimulates invention induced naval
construction with devices for war with ships, that ushered a new era in naval
warfare. The general fighting qualities of American soldiers, such as
steadiness, celerity, courage and intelligent obedience to orders, were made
apparent to all nations, and in a word, the power of the American Union of
States was developed.
